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INTRODUCTION 
Americans are seeing race and sex differently these days, and the 
workplace is no exception.  Indeed, there is reason to believe that managers are 
voluntarily and consciously considering the race and sex of employees in 
everyday employment decisions organizing work: who will serve on a hiring or 
recruitment committee, who will be assigned to which client or market, who 
will be asked to sit for interviews or photographs for publicity materials.  
These are all decisions about how and by whom work is accomplished—
decisions “organizing work”—rather than about who gains entry into a firm in 
the first place or where someone is placed within a clearly defined job 
hierarchy. 
Many of us realize that these decisions are sometimes, even frequently, 
based in part on race or sex.  We would be surprised to see a law school 
appointments committee comprised entirely of white men, even if most 
members of the faculty are white men.  Outside of the academy, moreover, the 
“diversity” discourse popular in the business press presents diversity as a 
business imperative.1  According to this discourse, valuing diversity and 
having a diverse workforce are morally correct and make economic sense.  By 
attaining, valuing, and managing diversity, businesses can get ahead.  They can 
tap into increasingly globalized and diverse markets and gain the benefits of an 
increasingly diverse national and international workforce.  This value-added 
case for diversity frames a particular narrative for managers regarding the 
relevance of race and sex in decisions organizing work.  According to that 
narrative, race and sex are relevant as means of serving markets and of 
signaling a firm’s commitment to diversity and its adherence to egalitarian 
norms. 
What we do not seem to realize is that race- and sex-based decisions 
organizing work have enormous potential to generate (and to reduce) 
workplace discrimination and inequality.  Decisions organizing work present 
 
 1 See Lauren B. Edelman et al., Diversity Rhetoric and the Managerialization of Law, 106 AM. J. SOC. 
1589, 1590 (2001) (identifying a diversity rhetoric in managerial literature that “extols the virtues of a diverse 
workforce and advocates ‘managing diversity’ and ‘valuing diversity’”); Erin Kelly & Frank Dobbin, How 
Affirmative Action Became Diversity Management: Employer Response to Antidiscrimination Law, 1961 to 
1996, 41 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 960, 972–73 (1998) (identifying a rise in “diversity management”).  The 
business case for diversity gained national prominence with the corporate amicus curiae briefs filed in Grutter 
v. Bollinger, an equal protection case challenging the use of race in graduate school admissions.  Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330–31 (2003) (citing amicus briefs of 3M et al. and of General Motors Corp.); see 
also infra notes 23–29 and accompanying text. 
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and arrange workers in relation to one another and, accordingly, shape the 
context for day-to-day intergroup interactions and relationships that are 
established and carried out at work.2  Intergroup interactions, whether at the 
water cooler or in the course of securing a lucrative business deal, can 
reinforce stereotypes, or break them down.  Social scientists have long 
understood that people tend to categorize similarities and differences during 
interaction as a way of making sense of each other3 and that the environmental 
features, or context, of an interaction can affect the salience of race and gender 
categories and can ultimately influence whether the interaction is stereotype 
confirming or stereotype challenging.4 
This and other research suggest that race- and sex-based decisions 
organizing work made pursuant to the prevailing relevance narrative will 
produce and further entrench workplace inequality.5  Not only are the decisions 
themselves (often based on ideas about group differences) likely to perpetuate 
stereotypes and to impose extra, “shadow” work on women and minorities, but 
race- and sex-based decisions organizing work made pursuant to the dominant 
narrative are also likely to create stratification in jobs and job functions and 
lead to devaluation along racial and gender lines, conditions that have been 
shown to foster stereotype-confirming interactions.6 
At the same time, a substantial body of social science research and theory 
points to race and sex in organizing work as potentially one of the most 
effective, untapped ways of reducing workplace discrimination.7  Studies have 
 
 2 Decisions organizing work are decisions that determine who does what work once workers have been 
included in the institution.  Although decisions organizing work can take place simultaneously with entry and 
promotion decisions, the decisions organizing work that I focus on in this Article allocate job functions, 
responsibilities, and conditions within job categories.  See Devon Carbado et al., After Inclusion, 4 ANN. REV. 
L. & SOC. SCI. 83, 84 (2008) (recognizing that “although determining precisely what happens before and 
during the moment in which a prospective employee is excluded from an employment opportunity remains 
crucial to antidiscrimination theory and practice, employment scholars are beginning to pay more attention to 
what happens to that person after she is hired and becomes an employee”). 
 3 See ERVING GOFFMAN, INTERACTION RITUAL: ESSAYS ON FACE-TO-FACE BEHAVIOR (1967); Cecilia L. 
Ridgeway, Interaction and the Conservation of Gender Inequality: Considering Employment, 62 AM. SOC. 
REV. 218 (1997).  This process of situating self and other through categorization continues throughout 
interaction.  See id. at 220. 
 4 GOFFMAN, supra note 3; Ridgeway, supra note 3; see also Barbara F. Reskin, Including Mechanisms 
in Our Models of Ascriptive Inequality, 68 AM. SOC. REV. 1 (2003); Cecilia L. Ridgeway, Linking Social 
Structure and Interpersonal Behavior: A Theoretical Perspective on Cultural Schemas and Social Relations, 
69 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 5 (2006). 
 5 See infra Part I.A. 
 6 Id. 
 7 See infra Part I.B. 
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shown, for example, that placing an African American on an otherwise all-
white interview panel can alter the deliberation among panel members and 
reduce the likelihood that biases and stereotypes will negatively affect the 
interaction between the panel members and African-American candidates.8  
Additional research suggests that improving the racial and gender balance in 
the work environment and expanding opportunities for peer-like contact and 
collaboration among workers from different racial and gender groups can lead 
to better career outcomes for women and people of color.9  It follows from this 
research that considering race and sex when composing work teams can reduce 
discriminatory biases and stereotyping in intergroup interaction by leading to 
more integrated teams. 
Legal scholars and antidiscrimination advocates alike have largely 
overlooked the risks and possibilities of considering race and sex in organizing 
work.  Surprisingly little attention has been paid to how employment 
discrimination law should treat race- and sex-based decisions made for 
business reasons10—and none has been aimed at understanding the role of law, 
 
 8 See Brian S. Lowery et al., Social Influence Effects on Automatic Racial Prejudice, 81 J. PERSONALITY 
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 842, 844–47 (2001); Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity and Group Decision 
Making: Identifying Multiple Effects of Racial Composition on Jury Deliberations, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 597 (2006).  See generally Russell K. Robinson, Perceptual Segregation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 
1175–77 (2008) (describing Sommers’s study and other research showing how perceptions of bias can 
influence interaction). 
 9 See LAUREL SMITH-DOERR, WOMEN’S WORK: GENDER EQUALITY VS. HIERARCHY IN THE LIFE 
SCIENCES (2004); Alexandra Kalev, Cracking the Glass Cages? Restructuring and Ascriptive Inequality at 
Work, 114 AM. J. SOC. 1591 (2009). 
 10 Much of the scholarship considering the law’s role in regulating race- and sex-based decisions has 
focused on the implications of the Supreme Court’s decision in Grutter v. Bollinger for the use of race in 
employers’ hiring decisions.  See, e.g., Cynthia L. Estlund, Putting Grutter to Work: Diversity, Integration, 
and Affirmative Action in the Workplace, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1 (2005); Paul Frymer & John D. 
Skrentny, The Rise of Instrumental Affirmative Action: Law and the New Significance of Race in America, 36 
CONN. L. REV. 677 (2004); Ronald Turner, Grutter, the Diversity Justification, and Workplace Affirmative 
Action, 43 BRANDEIS L.J. 199 (2004). 
This scholarship tends to coalesce around two largely competing views.  One sees the ascendance of 
the business case for diversity as an “echo” of largely discredited market-based arguments and cautions against 
a regulatory model that would allow employers more freedom to make consciously race- or sex-based 
employment decisions.  See, e.g., Frymer & Skrentny, supra (drawing parallels between the “instrumental 
affirmative action” logic of Grutter and bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) logic).  The other sees 
the ascendance of the business case for diversity, and the Supreme Court’s favorable nod in Grutter v. 
Bollinger, as offering a welcome opening for greater legal deference to the conscious use of race and sex in 
employment decisions.  See, e.g., Turner, supra, at 232–36 (arguing that Grutter creates room for race- and 
sex-based decisions to serve business interests in diversity); Rebecca Hanner White, Affirmative Action in the 
Workplace: The Significance of Grutter?, 92 KY. L.J. 263 (2003) (suggesting that Grutter presents 
opportunities for deference to an employer’s consideration of race and sex pursuant to a diversity rationale, 
despite the narrow BFOQ defense for sex and lack of BFOQ defense for race). 
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particularly the most far-reaching employment discrimination statute, Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act,11 in regulating consideration of race and sex in 
decisions organizing work.12 
This lack of critical examination of the permissibility of considering race 
and sex in decisions organizing work is even more striking because decisions 
organizing work differ from entry, promotion, and exit decisions in ways that 
are important to an antidiscrimination analysis.  They are “softer” in that their 
benefits and harms are not always immediately discernable.  Indeed, the 
benefits of decisions organizing work for those whose work is being organized 
are often not discernable without reference to relations, such as the opportunity 
to impress others or to overcome stereotypes.  Moreover, unlike race- and sex-
based decisions at key employment junctures like hiring or promotion, the use 
of race and sex in organizing work can impose tangible, work-related costs on 
individual women and members of minority groups, even when it is intended 
to further a nondiscrimination goal.  A woman who is assigned to a hiring 
committee because her presence will help minimize gender stereotyping, for 
example, may bear a cost in the form of additional work that goes 
uncompensated by the firm.  Even if she is financially compensated for the 
work, the assignment may hinder her career advancement by taking time and 
energy away from other work-related, career-building tasks. 
From a political perspective, because the benefits and harms of race- and 
sex-based decisions in organizing work are often “softer” and more difficult to 
discern, considering race and sex in organizing work may prove a more 
effective tool for reducing discrimination—and ultimately advancing social 
equality—than considering race and sex at more traditional, exhaustively 
 
I argue in this Article that Title VII—at least for decisions organizing work—offers an untapped 
regulatory middle ground, an opportunity to reframe the narrative guiding the use of race and sex in decisions 
organizing work to foster workplace integration and reduced discrimination.  Cf. Estlund, supra, at 31, 35–36 
(recognizing the “tension” between an interpretation of Title VII that permits “pro-integration preferences” and 
the business case for diversity as justification for preferences and proposing an approach that “skirts” that 
problem by providing employers deference when they seek to address a “‘manifest imbalance’ in a 
predominately white workplace or job”). 
 11 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub.L. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 241, 253 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 
2000e-17 (2006)). 
 12 Several scholars have argued in favor of a non-remedial justification for race- and sex-based decisions 
at moments of hiring, discharge, and promotion.  See Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A 
Behavioral Realist Revision of “Affirmative Action,” 94 CAL. L. REV. 1036, 1111–15 (2006) (arguing that 
hiring “debiasing agents” is permissible under the Constitution and Title VII); Michael J. Yelnosky, The 
Prevention Justification for Affirmative Action, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1385 (2003) (arguing for a “prevention 
justification” under Title VII). 
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contested moments of employment decision like hiring, discharge, or 
promotion.  Developing Title VII as it applies to decisions organizing work 
cannot entirely sidestep the debate surrounding affirmative action, but it does 
offer a new, promising avenue for change. 
This Article provides the first extended analysis of the conscious 
consideration of race and sex in organizing work.  It draws on research and 
literature in the fields of sociology, social psychology, and organizational 
theory to expose the risks and possibilities of permitting race- and sex-based 
decisions organizing work for workplace equality.  Based on this empirical 
foundation and on established Supreme Court case law setting limits and 
conditions on the use of race and sex in employment decisions under Title VII, 
the Article presents an argument that is equally normative and doctrinal.  It 
argues that Title VII permits (and should permit) the use of race and sex in 
decisions organizing work as a means of reducing workplace discrimination, 
although not as a means of serving business interests alone, and that Title VII 
requires (and should require) that those race- or sex-based decisions be part of 
an employer’s broader integrative effort, an effort comprised of various 
structural reforms that are likely to foster functional integration and reduce 
workplace discrimination.  This approach to the voluntary, conscious use of 
race and sex in organizing work adheres to the statutory goals of Title VII by 
limiting the scope of permissible justifications for race- and sex-based decision 
making and also by requiring a link between decisions that impose race- or 
sex-based costs on individual employees and furtherance of the statute’s 
broader goals. 
This interpretation of Title VII offers a unique opportunity to harness the 
popular business incentives for taking race and sex into account in organizing 
work to progress meaningful workplace integration and reduce discrimination.  
To the extent that considering race or sex in organizing work for prevailing 
business reasons overlaps with considering race and sex as a discrimination-
reducing measure, this interpretation of Title VII creates an incentive for 
employers to undertake integrative efforts.  At the same time, the interpretation 
reshapes the narrative regarding the relevance of race and sex in organizing 
work to emphasize functional integration; race and sex become relevant in 
decisions organizing work as means of facilitating stereotype- and bias-
challenging intergroup interaction and as means of fostering work cultures in 
which workers are valued for individual contributions rather than for expected 
group differences. 
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In addition to providing a much-needed critical analysis of the 
permissibility of race and sex in organizing work and offering an opening for 
Title VII law to facilitate workplace integration, this Article advances a larger 
theoretical goal.  It seeks to broaden the shift in emphasis from individuals to 
structural and systemic change that is currently underway in the legal 
scholarship13 to include an understanding of the role that social interactions 
play in producing and reproducing disadvantage at work.  Existing focus has 
been on reducing cognitive and motivational biases in key decision makers.14  
This Article attends more closely to biases as they operate in social relations.15 
Several important advantages inure from this theoretical move.  One, of 
course, is accuracy.  In the tradition of behavioral realism, this Article takes the 
position that accurately conceptualizing discrimination as it operates in the 
workplace (and elsewhere) is a crucial first step to devising effective avenues 
for change.16  Conceptualizing discrimination with a relational component 
makes it easier to see that discrimination is often not the product of a single 
individual acting in isolation but rather of multiple people acting in concert,17 
 
 13 It is becoming increasingly clear that employment discrimination law, to be effective, must focus more 
on structural and systemic change over the “ex post facto identification of specific instances of 
discrimination.”  Susan T. Fiske & Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Policy Implications of Unexamined 
Discrimination: Gender Bias in Employment as a Case Study, in BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATIONS OF POLICY 
(Eldar Shafir ed., forthcoming).  Proponents of a “structuralist” move in employment discrimination law, who 
include social scientists as well as legal scholars, argue that the organizational and institutional conditions that 
facilitate workplace discrimination warrant greater regulatory attention.  See Robert L. Nelson et al., Divergent 
Paths: Conflicting Conceptions of Employment Discrimination in Law and the Social Sciences, 4 ANN. REV. L. 
& SOC. SCI. 103, 109 (2008) (“The narrowing of employment discrimination law and focus on individualized 
claims of discrimination stand in stark contrast to sociological research, which locates discrimination in the 
structure of employment and the workplace.”).  See generally Tristin K. Green, A Structural Approach as 
Antidiscrimination Mandate: Locating Employer Wrong, 60 VAND. L. REV. 849, 857–65 (2007) (describing a 
structural approach to employment discrimination law). 
 14 See Tristin K. Green & Alexandra Kalev, Discrimination-Reducing Measures at the Relational Level, 
59 HASTINGS L.J. 1435 (2008) (arguing that efforts to devise discrimination-reducing measures have focused 
too narrowly at the individual level and should be expanded to include the relational level of discrimination). 
 15 Instead of drawing principally on the research and literature on implicit biases, which tends to 
emphasize individual mindsets, I build the empirical foundation for this Article more directly from research 
and theory in the fields of sociology, organizational theory, and new institutionalism.  These disciplines 
emphasize structure and systems at the same time that they conceptualize discrimination—and regulation—to 
include processes of social interaction.  See generally CHARLES TILLY, DURABLE INEQUALITY (1998) (urging 
emphasis on transactions and social relations over individualism). 
 16 Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment Discrimination Law: 
Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CAL. L. REV. 997, 997–1002 (2006) (describing behavioral 
realism). 
 17 These actors include members of groups whose subordination the law seeks to combat.  Attending to 
relations in employment discrimination law requires therefore that we develop both a better understanding of 
women and people of color as more than passive victims as well as a better understanding of how behavioral 
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and that race and gender are actively constructed and negotiated in interactions 
at work.18 
Attending to relations also uncovers the interconnectedness of various 
structural mechanisms for change and reveals the importance of narrative and 
ideology to guide the implementation of reform in organizations.  Attending to 
relations shows, for example, that altering organizational structures to motivate 
individuals to correct for their biases at moments of key decision making will 
be insufficient as an equality measure if interaction between members of 
different groups reinforces stereotypes and biases leading up to those 
decisions; nor will increasing the numbers of women and minorities in a 
particular job category be sufficient if day-to-day relations produce and 
reproduce bias in ways that result in social closure.19  Similarly, structural 
changes at the policy level of an organization are unlikely to have much 
meaningful effect on discrimination and inequality in the workplace if the 
dominant narrative regarding the relevance of race and sex to work and work 
assignments perpetuates biases in relations between workers.20 
The Article proceeds in three Parts.  Part I sets the empirical groundwork 
for an approach to race and sex in organizing work that is cognizant of 
business interests but that does not defer entirely to the use of race and sex in 
pursuit of those interests.  I briefly summarize some of the sociolegal literature 
uncovering the value-added case for diversity that is likely to guide current 
consideration of race and sex in organizing work, and I examine the likely 
effects of race- and sex-based decisions made pursuant to that case.  I argue 
 
expectations can be discriminatory.  See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Interactions at Work: 
Remembering David Charny, 17 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 13, 18 (2001). 
 18 See generally CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 
2d ed. 2000); Ian F. Haney López, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, 
Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1994).  Attending to relations brings into focus the 
interpersonal ways in which race and gender are constructed on a daily basis.  See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu 
Gulati, The Law and Economics of Critical Race Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1757, 1760–61 (2003) (book review) 
(describing “race-producing practices” at the micro level). 
 19 See, e.g., VINCENT J. ROSCIGNO, THE FACE OF DISCRIMINATION: HOW RACE AND GENDER IMPACT 
WORK AND HOME LIVES (2007) (using cases from the Ohio Civil Rights Commission to uncover the social 
processes of discrimination and arguing that sociologists tend to focus on structures to the neglect of social 
interaction, the “face” of discrimination). 
 20 Instead, research suggests that without attention to relations, changes at the policy level can become 
“decoupled” from day-to-day processes of discrimination.  THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL 
ANALYSIS (Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991); Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and 
Symbolic Structures: Organizational Mediation of Civil Rights Law, 97 AM. J. SOC. 1531 (1992); John W. 
Meyer & Brian Rowan, Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony, 83 AM. J. 
SOC. 340 (1977). 
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that the narrative that emerges from the business case for diversity regarding 
the relevance of race and sex in organizing work is likely to produce race- and 
sex-based decisions that entrench rather than destabilize inequality.  I then 
present research showing that consideration of race and sex in organizing work 
can serve as an important discrimination-reducing measure, particularly when 
individual race- and sex-based decisions are part of a broader program of 
systemic reforms aimed at increasing opportunities for cross-boundary, peer-
like interaction and collaboration.  Attention to race and sex in organizing 
work can help shift the demographic and power imbalances that facilitate 
biases in relations between workers; it can foster work environments that 
produce stereotype-challenging rather than stereotype-reinforcing intergroup 
interactions. 
In this Part, I also consider whether and to what extent race- and sex-based 
decisions organizing work will fall beneath the radar of Title VII.  I argue that, 
despite several doctrinal and practical hurdles, decisions organizing work are 
unlikely to be fully insulated from Title VII challenge.  Moreover, I argue that 
it would be unwise to seek to insulate race- and sex-based decisions organizing 
work from Title VII inquiry. 
In Part II, I apply Title VII to decisions organizing work and argue for an 
interpretation of Title VII that permits consideration of race and sex in 
decisions organizing work but that requires that race- and sex-based decisions 
be tied to the statute’s broader nondiscrimination goals.  Specifically, I make 
the following three principal claims: (1) Title VII permits consideration of race 
and sex in organizing work to further the goal of reducing workplace 
discrimination, but not to further business interests alone; (2) Title VII requires 
a link between any individual decision considering race or sex and furtherance 
of the broader nondiscrimination goals of Title VII (a “micro–macro” link); 
and (3) the micro–macro link is established when a race- or sex-based decision 
organizing work is part of an employer’s systemic effort to foster functional, 
discrimination-reducing integration within its workplace. 
Part III considers possibilities and addresses anticipated concerns, 
including concerns about the practical difficulties in monitoring employers’ 
integrative efforts and about the effect of a reshaped narrative regarding the 
relevance of race and sex in decisions organizing work on social equality 
goals. 
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I. RACE- AND SEX-BASED DECISIONS ORGANIZING WORK 
In this Part, I consider how race and sex are likely being considered in 
decisions organizing work and how they might be considered.  According to 
the narrative that emerges from the business case for diversity, race and sex are 
relevant in decisions organizing work primarily as means of serving particular 
markets and of signaling adherence to egalitarian norms and compliance with 
the law.  Decisions made pursuant to this narrative are likely to perpetuate 
stereotypes and to entrench workplace inequality.  Research also suggests, 
however, that considering race and sex in organizing work can serve as an 
important discrimination-reducing measure. 
A. Race and Sex in Organizing Work Pursuant to the Prevailing Narrative 
There are several reasons to believe that race and sex are being considered 
in decisions organizing work.  Decisions organizing work—much more so than 
decisions about who should be hired in the first place or even who should be 
awarded a promotion—are based on perceptions arising out of day-to-day 
interactions.  In most workplaces, those interactions are likely to be both laden 
with stereotypes and stereotype reinforcing.21  The substantial literature on the 
operation of cognitive and motivational biases confirms this basic point and 
suggests that biases are prevalent and likely to infect decisions organizing 
work.22 
The narrative concerning the relevance of race and sex that emerges from 
the prevailing business case for diversity, however, suggests that race and sex 
are being taken into account in organizing work not just in the form of implicit 
biases but also in the form of consciously considered factors.  The business 
case for diversity that surfaced in the professional managerial literature in the 
mid-1980s gained substantial ground in the early 1990s.23  Research by 
sociologist Frank Dobbin suggests that the business case for diversity emerged 
in part as a response by professionals in personnel management to Reagan-era 
 
 21 See infra notes 36–39 and accompanying text (describing the effects of stratification on stereotypes 
and biases in interaction). 
 22 See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to 
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995) (detailing studies showing 
the role of cognitive biases in subjective, multi-factored decisions). 
 23 See Edelman et al., supra note 1, at 1609–15 (documenting the rise and progression of diversity 
rhetoric in the professional management literature); Kelly & Dobbin, supra note 1, at 971–78 (crediting the 
rise of business-based arguments for diversity from 1988 to 1996 to EEO managers and management 
consultants). 
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cuts in enforcement of antidiscrimination law and opposition to affirmative 
action and that it was buttressed by beliefs about globalization and about the 
changing nature of the entry-level American workforce.24  According to the 
business case for diversity, sometimes called the case for “diversity 
management,” a diverse workforce is a resource—a way of getting ahead—and 
a business imperative.  Diversity (and managing diversity) allows 
organizations to better reach and serve an increasingly diverse and globalized 
market and to benefit from an increasingly diverse and globalized workforce.25 
Although researchers have yet to pinpoint the precise extent to which the 
business case for diversity has caught on within firms, studies do suggest a 
shift in organizational approaches toward diversity that is consistent with the 
rise of diversity management rhetoric in the business literature.  Researchers 
have documented, for example, a shift toward diversity management in 
business schools and human resource programs and have documented the 
adoption of diversity rhetoric by particular firms.26  Over the past several 
decades, moreover, private firms have adopted an array of practices aimed at 
managing diversity, including diversity committees and taskforces, diversity 
 
 24 FRANK DOBBIN, INVENTING EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 133–60 (2009) (tying the “Reagan Revolution” to 
the rise of diversity management); Kelly & Dobbin, supra note 1, at 967 (“Reagan curtailed administrative 
enforcement of EEO and AA dramatically and appointed federal judges opposed to regulation in general and 
to affirmative action in particular.  These changes appeared to threaten the EEO/AA system hashed out in the 
1970s.  EEO/AA specialists responded by developing efficiency arguments for their programs.”).  Researchers 
also trace a rise in diversity management to misinterpretation of a report issued in 1987 by the Secretary of 
Labor, “which carried the message that white men would make up little of the twenty-first century workforce.”  
DOBBIN, supra, at 159; see also Edelman et al., supra note 1, at 1614. 
 25 See Edelman et al., supra note 1, at 1618–19 (describing the “prominent themes” in diversity 
literature); Kelly & Dobbin, supra note 1, at 973–75. 
 26 DOBBIN, supra note 24, at 142 (describing changes in business schools and national conferences 
devoted to diversity management); Kelly & Dobbin, supra note 1, at 977–78 (describing changes toward 
diversity management in rhetoric and focus of specialists and business groups); see also David A. Thomas & 
Robin J. Ely, Making Differences Matter: A New Paradigm for Managing Diversity, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.–
Oct. 1996, at 79, 83 (describing a managerial sense in some firms that a diverse workforce is needed to 
“understand and serve [their] customers better and to gain legitimacy with them”).  The “value-added” model 
for framing diversity documented in some firms is also consistent with the view that the business case for 
diversity has been accepted by businesses, even as the model may alienate minorities and derail other diversity 
initiatives.  See Victoria C. Plaut, Cultural Models of Diversity in America: The Psychology of Difference and 
Inclusion, in ENGAGING CULTURAL DIFFERENCES: THE MULTICULTURAL CHALLENGE IN LIBERAL 
DEMOCRACIES 365 (Richard A. Shweder et al. eds., 2002) (identifying the “value-added” model); Flannery G. 
Stevens et al., Unlocking the Benefits of Diversity: All-Inclusive Multiculturalism and Positive Organizational 
Change, 44 J. APPLIED BEHAV. SCI. 116 (2008) (assessing limitations of the multiculturalism and 
colorblindness models of diversity adopted by organizations). 
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training, and diversity evaluations of managers.27  This sense that the business 
case for diversity has been accepted by organizations is also reflected in the 
amicus curiae briefs submitted by major corporations in favor of affirmative 
action in higher education in the Supreme Court case, Grutter v. Bollinger.28  
The corporations emphasized in their briefs that diversity at all levels of their 
workforces is crucial to serving an increasingly international market and to 
reaching specific racial and cultural communities.29   
Managers who make day-to-day employment decisions, including 
decisions organizing work, do so within this organizational frame.  A diverse 
workforce is “valued” according to this frame, and race and sex may therefore 
be considered relevant to hiring, firing, and promotion decisions as means of 
creating and maintaining a diverse workforce.30  But integration and intergroup 
 
 27 See Alexandra Kalev et al., Best Practices or Best Guesses? Assessing the Efficacy of Corporate 
Affirmative Action and Diversity Policies, 71 AM. SOC. REV. 589, 590 (2006) (examining the effects of seven 
common diversity programs—affirmative action plans, diversity committees and taskforces, diversity 
managers, diversity training, diversity evaluations for managers, networking programs, and mentoring 
programs—on the representation of protected groups in management at private firms). 
 28 Brief of General Motors Corp. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 13–14, 17, Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02–241), 2003 WL 399096 [hereinafter Amicus Curiae Brief of General 
Motors Corp.] (arguing that managers and employees from diverse backgrounds can translate their cross-
cultural understandings to “creative product development, community outreach, and marketing and advertising 
campaigns” while “engag[ing] daily in transnational, cross-cultural, and interracial contacts”); Brief for Amici 
Curiae 65 Leading American Businesses in Support of Respondents at 7, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 
(2003) (No. 02–241), 2003 WL 399056 (explaining that diverse employees “are better able to develop 
products and services that appeal to a variety of consumers and to market offerings in ways that appeal to those 
consumers”); Motion for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae Out of Time and Brief of MTV Networks in 
Support of Respondents at 2–3, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02–241), 2003 WL 1785765 
[hereinafter Amicus Curiae Brief of MTV Networks] (“[A] diverse workforce is critical to the development 
and marketing of programming targeted to specific racial and cultural communities . . . .”).  The briefs also 
emphasize the importance of obtaining employees who have experience with diversity or “cross-cultural 
competence.”  See, e.g., Amicus Curiae Brief of General Motors Corp., supra, at 4. 
Although the narrative as currently framed by the business case for diversity focuses on race and sex as 
means of serving diverse markets and signaling adherence to egalitarian norms, some of the corporate briefs 
were quite aspirational in their arguments regarding the need for cross-cultural competence.  See id.  Those 
aspirations are consistent with integrative efforts in employment, even if they are not now resulting in 
decisions organizing work that facilitate meaningful integration.  See infra notes 102 & 173 and accompanying 
text. 
 29 Amicus Curiae Brief of General Motors Corp., supra note 28, at 13–14; Amicus Curiae Brief of MTV 
Networks, supra note 28, at 2–3. 
 30 That race and sex might be considered as a way of attaining or maintaining diversity is consistent with 
Professor Dobbin’s research showing that “diversity management” evolved from affirmative action measures, 
but his research also shows that the “diversity” practices promoted under diversity management tend not to 
include preferences for women or minorities.  DOBBIN, supra note 25, at 101–32; Kelly & Dobbin, supra note 
1, at 978–81.  Other research suggests that these diversity practices, including diversity training, are largely 
ineffective equality measures.  See Kalev et al., supra note 27. 
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equality are not dominant themes of the business case for diversity.31  For 
decisions organizing work, therefore, the business case for diversity translates 
into a thin narrative regarding the relevance of race and sex: Race and sex are 
relevant primarily as means of serving markets and of signaling commitment to 
diversity and adherence to egalitarian norms and laws. 
And, although it is possible that race- and sex-based decisions made 
pursuant to the business case for diversity at moments of entry, promotion, and 
exit will result in more diverse workforces overall,32 race- and sex-based 
decisions made pursuant to the business case for diversity at the level of 
organizing work are likely to entrench rather than destabilize inequality in 
organizations.  As should be relatively obvious from the description above, 
race- and sex-based decisions organizing work pursuant to the “service” prong 
of the prevailing narrative are likely to be based on and to perpetuate 
stereotypes about group difference.33  Moreover, race- and sex-matching is 
likely to lead to stratification within workforces as women and minorities 
become pigeonholed in certain jobs or job functions34 and as those jobs or 
functions labeled “female” or “minority” are devalued.35 
The stratification that results from these race- and sex-based decisions 
organizing work is also likely to further entrench workplace inequality by 
setting a particular context for intergroup interaction.  The segregated, low 
status of women’s and minorities’ jobs and job functions is likely to activate 
gender and racial stereotypes and biases in interaction between workers across 
and within jobs.36  A range of studies in social psychology and sociology 
confirms that status and power differentials lead to greater reliance on 
 
 31 See Frank Linnehan & Alison M. Konrad, Diluting Diversity: Implications for Intergroup Inequality in 
Organizations, 8 J. MGMT. INQUIRY 399 (1999) (critiquing the diversity management literature for failure to 
emphasize intergroup inequality). 
 32 When race or sex are considered as conscious factors in entry, promotion, or exit decisions, they are 
more likely to take the form of “preferences” for women and people of color.  See Estlund, supra note 10, at 3. 
 33 See Elizabeth Chambliss, Organizational Determinants of Law Firm Integration, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 
669, 743 (1997) (noting that the “identification of minority lawyers with minority clients may . . . become 
problematic . . . by increasing ethnic segmentation within the firms”); David B. Wilkins, From “Separate Is 
Inherently Unequal” to “Diversity Is Good for Business”: The Rise of Market-Based Diversity Arguments and 
the Fate of the Black Corporate Bar, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1548, 1594–97 (2004).  See generally Barbara F. 
Reskin, The Proximate Causes of Employment Discrimination, 29 CONTEMP. SOC. 319, 321 (2000). 
 34 See, e.g., Wilkins, supra note 33, at 1594–95 (describing difficulty for black lawyers seeking to 
specialize in practice areas in which being black is not seen as providing added value). 
 35 DONALD TOMASKOVIC-DEVEY, GENDER & RACIAL INTEGRATION AT WORK: THE SOURCES & 
CONSEQUENCES OF JOB SEGREGATION 3 (1993). 
 36 Reskin, supra note 33, at 325. 
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stereotypes.37  Men and women are more likely, for example, to enact gender-
typical behavior during interactions in which men are perceived as having 
higher organizational status.  Men are more likely in these circumstances to 
interrupt in conversation, and women are more likely to qualify their 
statements.38  Just as the patrimonial relationships between female secretaries 
and their male bosses described in Rosabeth Moss Kanter’s famous 
ethnography of the 1970s corporation worked so starkly to the disadvantage of 
women, so, too, the intergroup interactions carried out in modern workplaces 
in which women and minorities are segregated along racial and gender lines 
are likely to perpetuate stereotypes and disadvantage.39 
Race- and sex-based decisions organizing work made pursuant to the 
“signaling” prong of the prevailing narrative (signaling commitment to 
diversity and adherence to egalitarian norms and laws) are also likely to 
negatively affect the overall job successes of women and minorities, even if the 
decisions do not pigeonhole workers into particular job categories or 
perpetuate stereotypes regarding group difference.  Singling women and 
minorities out for signaling work may generate or exacerbate feelings of 
exploitation and isolation reported by women and people of color in male- and 
white-dominated workplaces.40  At the same time, the decisions can generate 
feelings of resentment among white men, who are likely to believe that race or 
sex always plays a role when a woman or person of color is placed on a 
prestigious committee or team or is assigned to a potentially lucrative client.41 
 
 37 See generally Cecilia L. Ridgeway & Lynn Smith-Lovin, The Gender System and Interaction, 25 ANN. 
REV. SOC. 191 (1999) (describing and developing expectation states theory, which holds that men and women 
recreate the gender system when they interact in a context of structural inequality); Don Operario & Susan T. 
Fiske, Racism Equals Power Plus Prejudice: A Social Psychological Equation for Racial Oppression, in 
CONFRONTING RACISM: THE PROBLEM AND THE RESPONSE 33, 34–35 (Jennifer L. Eberhardt & Susan T. Fiske 
eds., 1998) (discussing the influence of power on stereotypic thinking and perceived intergroup differences). 
 38 Ridgeway & Smith-Lovin, supra note 37, at 202.  Studies suggest similar dynamics in mixed-race 
interactions.  See Mark Chen & John A. Bargh, Nonconscious Behavioral Confirmation Processes: The Self-
Fulfilling Consequences of Automatic Stereotype Activation, 33 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 541 (1997) 
(showing that people are likely to stereotype when interacting with people of a different race). 
 39 ROSABETH MOSS KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION 72–87 (1977) (describing 
relationships between male bosses and their female secretaries in the 1970s and the ways in which those 
relationships disadvantaged women). 
 40 See, e.g., Wilkins, supra note 33, at 1597–98 (“Blacks who feel that they are being pressed into service 
solely because of their race frequently come away from such encounters feeling devalued and exploited.”).  
The dominant narrative also leads to an erroneous conception that race is relevant in organizing work only for 
non-whites.  See infra Part III.B (discussing possibilities of a reshaped narrative). 
 41 See, e.g., Faye Crosby & Susan Clayton, Affirmative Action and the Issue of Expectancies, 46 J. SOC. 
ISSUES 61, 66–68 (1990) (“The mere existence of an affirmative action program may reinforce existing 
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In addition, race- and sex-based decisions organizing work can 
disadvantage women and minorities by imposing extra work on members of 
those groups.  Imagine a law school, for example, at which women and 
minority professors are asked to attend more student recruitment functions, 
pose for more pictures and answer more media inquiries, and serve on more 
faculty panels.  Even if the dean makes these requests with laudable goals in 
mind (for example, as a way of increasing student diversity or fostering alumni 
involvement), the women and people of color who are asked to do this extra 
work may suffer real job-related consequences.  Time spent recruiting students 
and talking to the media, after all, is time spent away from other career-
building work.  Similar effects are likely to carry over into non-academic 
settings.42  Because the dominant narrative suggests that considering race and 
sex is justified by business interests, including the interest in signaling, 
employers are unlikely to consider costs imposed by race- and sex-based 
decisions, whether as a basis for financial compensation or otherwise.43 
B. Race and Sex in Organizing Work Pursuant to an Integration Narrative 
Not all consideration of race and sex in decisions organizing work is 
counterproductive to achieving equality at work.  A vast and growing body of 
social science and organizational theory shows that attention to race and sex in 
decisions organizing work has the potential to act as an important 
discrimination-reducing measure by altering the structure and context of 
workplace relations.  Specifically, race- and sex-conscious decisions 
organizing work can create opportunities for more peer-like, cross-boundary, 
collaborative work and can generally facilitate an integrated work environment 
that is likely to reduce biases and stereotyping in interaction.44 
 
stereotypes about minority group members and White women, which hold that the targeted groups are not 
really qualified for certain positions and could not have obtained them in the absence of affirmative action.”). 
 42 See generally John D. Skrentny, Are America’s Civil Rights Laws Still Relevant?, 4 DU BOIS REV. 119 
(2007).  One African-American law professor related to me his experience of being assigned to the hiring 
committee as an associate at a law firm and then being criticized for low billable hours the month the firm sent 
him out of state to recruit. 
 43 Indeed, women and people of color might be expected to undertake this extra “diversity” work in 
exchange for being hired.  Catherine Fisk, Presentation at Employment and Labor Law Colloquium, San Diego 
(Oct. 2008). 
 44 The argument in this section builds on an article written by sociologist Alexandra Kalev and me in 
which we present research showing that bias and stereotypes are executed and reinforced in day-to-day 
interactions and argue that employers can reduce discrimination by organizing work in ways that change the 
context of workplace relations.  See Green & Kalev, supra note 15, at 1445–53. 
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Racial and gender integration in work has long been understood to reduce 
discrimination.  The effects of “tokenism” are now well known: Women and 
minorities are less likely to be the subject of stereotyping and more likely to be 
valued for their individual contributions if they are one among several of their 
socially salient group than if they are one among none or few.45  But research 
also shows that interaction between members of different groups (and not just 
evaluation of women and minorities by men and whites) is directed away from 
rather than toward discrimination by demographic diversity.  Women and 
minorities working in settings where there is a “critical mass” of members of 
their group are likely to perceive less bias from others.46  The reduced salience 
of minority-group status in integrated groups also eases pressure to conform 
and reduces feelings of isolation and inferiority that can develop in skewed 
environments.47 
More broadly, integration in work can reduce workplace discrimination by 
breaking down status and power differentials.48  Just as segregation in jobs and 
job functions can lead to devaluation of those jobs or functions that are labeled 
“female” or “minority”49 and can serve to activate gender and racial 
stereotypes and biases,50 conditions of integration in work in which status 
differentials are less salient can lead to lower levels of stereotyping and bias in 
intergroup interaction.51  This basic point is consistent with longstanding 
research on the contact hypothesis: The positive effects of intergroup contact 
 
 45 KANTER, supra note 39, at 221–22; Krieger, supra note 22, at 1193 (reviewing studies on the cognitive 
bases of tokenism); Barbara M. Reskin et al., The Determinants and Consequences of Workplace Sex and Race 
Composition, 25 ANN. REV. SOC. 335, 348–55 (1999) (discussing the effect of workplace demographics on 
stereotyping).  Kanter argues that representation of less than fifteen percent of the relevant population creates 
“skewed groups” and the detrimental effects of tokenism.  See KANTER, supra note 39, at 208–12. 
 46 See generally Robinson, supra note 8 (examining research on the perception of bias on the part of 
women and people of color, both widely and in more specific contexts, and the effect of that perception on 
interaction). 
 47 KANTER, supra note 39, at 248–49 (noting that people whose type is present in small numbers tend to 
be more visible, feel pressure to conform, often try to become invisible, find it hard to gain credibility, feel 
isolated and peripheral, can be excluded from informal peer networks, have fewer opportunities to be 
sponsored, face stress, and are often stereotyped). 
 48 See supra notes 36–39 and accompanying text. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Ridgeway & Smith-Lovin, supra note 37; see also Green & Kalev, supra note 15, at 1447 (describing 
several lines of research that support this point). 
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are enhanced when interaction takes place in pursuit of common goals and 
under conditions of equal status and institutional support.52 
Recent research in the employment context also suggests that integrated 
work teams in which peer-like collaboration is encouraged can reduce 
discrimination and lead to better career outcomes for women and minorities.  
In one study of the careers of women scientists, sociologist Laurel Smith-Doerr 
found that women who worked in bio-technology firms, where scientists tend 
to interact on collaborative projects and are rewarded as a group and evaluated 
by their peers, were significantly more likely to attain supervisory positions 
than women who worked in academia, where scientists tend to adhere to rigid 
job categories, individual reward structures, and hierarchies.53 
Smith-Doerr’s findings are consistent with a recent nationwide study of 
firms conducted by sociologist Alexandra Kalev.54  Kalev found that women 
and minorities were more likely to be promoted into the managerial ranks in 
firms that adopted cross-boundary work teams—work teams that bring 
together workers from different jobs on a regular basis to share information 
and participate in decision making—than in firms that did not adopt those 
types of teams.55  She also found that training programs that involved job 
rotation led to greater success for women and minorities than programs that 
focused on in-job training.56  As more organizations restructure work to be 
team based, these findings become particularly important for the 
discrimination-reducing potential of race and sex in organizing work.57 
 
 52 GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 281 (1954); Thomas F. Pettigrew & Linda R. 
Tropp, A Meta-Analytic Test of Intergroup Contact Theory, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 751, 758–61 
(2006). 
 53 SMITH-DOERR, supra note 9; see also Kjersten Bunker Whittington & Laurel Smith-Doerr, Women 
Inventors in Context: Disparities in Patenting Across Academia and Industry, 22 GENDER & SOC’Y 194, 194 
(2008) (finding that women life scientists have higher patenting productivity in organizations with “network-
based organizational structures”). 
 54 Kalev, supra note 9, at 1608 (the study includes firms across nine industries). 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
 57 By 2002, between forty and eighty percent of medium and large American workplaces had adopted 
self-directed work teams, problem-solving teams, cross-job training, or job training programs.  See ARNE L. 
KALLEBERG ET AL., ORGANIZATIONS IN AMERICA: ANALYZING THEIR STRUCTURES AND HUMAN RESOURCE 
PRACTICES (1996); Paul Osterman, Work Reorganization in an Era of Restructuring: Trends in Diffusion and 
Effects on Employee Welfare, 53 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 179 (2000).  For evidence that team-based work is 
growing across sectors of the workforce, see Thomas Bailey et al., The Effect of High-Performance Work 
Practices on Employee Earnings in the Steel, Apparel, and Medical Electronics and Imaging Industries, 54 
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 525 (2001). 
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Integrated decision-making committees can also reduce discrimination by 
altering both the biases of committee members and the deliberative process of 
the committee and by affecting the interaction between committee members 
and applicants or other interviewees.  Several studies have shown that whites 
tend to exhibit less implicit racial bias on the Implicit Attitudes Test (IAT) 
when they make decisions in the presence of an African American.58  Another 
recent study compared the decision making of racially mixed and all-white 
juries after they watched a video simulating the trial of a black defendant in a 
criminal case.59  The researcher found that, even before deliberating, white 
jurors were less likely to find the defendant guilty if they were members of a 
racially mixed jury than if they were members of an all-white jury.60  During 
deliberations, racially mixed juries also discussed more facts and corrected 
more factual misstatements of fellow jurors than all-white juries.61 
Interactions during interviews, too, are likely to be affected by the racial 
and gender makeup of the interviewing committee.  Studies reveal that 
interviews in which the interviewer scores high in implicit bias are more 
awkward—evinced by more speech errors, less eye contact, and more 
distancing body language by both the interviewer and the interviewee—than 
interviews in which the interviewer scores low in implicit bias.62  The studies 
show that an interviewee is likely to replicate unfriendly behavior of an 
interviewer so that the interaction as a whole is less positive.63  Because an 
interview panel that is demographically diverse is less likely to be perceived as 
biased, it is less likely to facilitate the operation of discriminatory stereotypes 
and biases in the interview.64 
 
This organizational move also poses the risk of entrenching and perpetuating inequality if it is not 
accompanied by attention to biases in day-to-day decisions and interactions.  See Tristin K. Green, 
Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 99–108 (2003) (describing some of the possible effects of reorganization toward 
decentralized decision making and team-based work on workplace equality). 
 58 Brian S. Lowery et al., Social Influence Effects on Automatic Racial Prejudice, 81 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 842, 844–47 (2001).  See generally Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit 
Bias, 94 CAL. L. REV. 969, 981–82 (2006) (listing additional studies). 
 59 See Sommers, supra note 8.  See generally Robinson, supra note 8, at 1175–77 (describing Sommers’s 
study). 
 60 Sommers, supra note 8, at 603. 
 61 Id. at 605. 
 62 Allen R. McConnell & Jill M. Leibold, Relations Among the Implicit Association Test, Discriminatory 
Behavior, and Explicit Measures of Racial Attitudes, 37 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 435, 439–40 (2001). 
 63 See Chen & Bargh, supra note 38. 
 64 See Robinson, supra note 8, at 1171–73. 
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However, despite this research supporting the idea that integration in work 
can reduce discrimination by expanding opportunities for peer-like contact, 
collaboration, and decision making among workers from different racial and 
gender groups, most workplaces remain highly segregated, with women and 
people of color concentrated in the lower-level, less-valued jobs and job 
functions.65  The smaller representation of many protected groups in the 
working population as a whole also makes it difficult for these groups to attain 
substantial numbers in each segment of a workforce.  Without attention to race 
or sex in organizing work, therefore, work teams and decision-making 
committees drawn from all but the lowest-level jobs will only rarely be 
diverse.66 
Research also suggests that taking race or sex into account to alter the work 
environment can reduce discrimination.67  A physically integrated workplace 
can facilitate interaction and aid in the development of egalitarian norms.68  
Taking race and sex into account in devising promotional materials and in 
assigning clients or projects, provided that the materials and assignments are 
publicized within the firm, can also help reduce discrimination, particularly in 
conjunction with efforts to integrate work and decision-making bodies.  This is 
because valuing women and people of color as contributors can help instill 
favorable work cultures and norms for reducing discrimination.69  And 
assigning women and people of color to key, prestigious client bases can alter 
the informal power structures that serve to entrench segregation.70 
 
 65 BARBARA F. RESKIN, THE REALITIES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN EMPLOYMENT 21 (1998); 
TOMASKOVIC-DEVEY, supra note 35; Barbara Reskin, Sex Segregation in the Workplace, 19 ANN. REV. SOC. 
241, 246 (1993); Donald Tomaskovic-Devey et al., Documenting Desegregation: Segregation in American 
Workplaces by Race, Ethnicity, and Sex, 1966–2003, 71 AM. SOC. REV. 565 (2006). 
 66 This does not mean, of course, that members of different racial and gender groups do not interact; it 
means only that their interactions take place in a context that is likely to reinforce biases and stereotypes rather 
than break them down. 
 67 See Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 58, at 981 (describing studies on the effect of population diversity on 
levels of implicit bias); Kang & Banaji, supra note 12, at 1102–08 (describing studies on the effects of 
intergroup contact and of “countertypical exemplars” on levels of implicit bias). 
 68 See Reskin et al., supra note 45, at 354 (“[T]heorists concur that workplace composition is 
consequential for workers and work organization.”); see also Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination Law’s Effects 
on Implicit Bias, in  3 NYU SELECTED ESSAYS ON LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW: BEHAVIORAL ANALYSES OF 
WORKPLACE DISCRIMINATION 69, 82–90 (Mitu Gulati & Michael J. Yelnosky eds., 2007) (describing how 
existing antidiscrimination law decreases discrimination caused by implicit biases by altering the demographic 
makeup of the workplace). 
 69 See generally Tristin K. Green, Work Culture and Discrimination, 93 CAL. L. REV. 623 (2005) 
(describing the role that work culture plays in discrimination and identifying ways to trigger structural changes 
that reshape work cultures). 
 70 See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text. 
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Taken together, this research suggests that considering race and sex 
pursuant to an integration narrative in decisions organizing work—in staffing 
work teams, assigning clients, creating decision-making committees, even in 
arranging physical spaces—can play an important role in reducing 
discrimination.  The research also indicates, however, that individual decisions 
organizing work are unlikely alone to result in any substantial reduction in 
discrimination.  Indeed, the research teaches that attention to race and sex in 
organizing work will be most effective as a discrimination-reducing measure if 
it is accompanied by overarching, system-wide integrative efforts.71  Regular 
monitoring of systemic and local demographics and power imbalances, 
structural changes that open up opportunities for collaborative work 
opportunities, and measures that foster egalitarian and peer-support 
overarching norms and work cultures are all important to achieving meaningful 
integration in work.72 
This research calls out for a regulatory middle ground.  Instead of 
prohibiting all consideration of race and sex in organizing work or deferring 
entirely to race- and sex-based decisions made pursuant to the prevailing 
narrative, the law might harness existing business interests to advance 
structural and cultural changes in organizations that will increase integration in 
work and also to foster individual race- and sex-based decisions in organizing 
work that serve the broader goal of reducing discrimination.  In doing so, the 
law might reshape the narrative regarding the relevance of race and sex in 
organizing work to emphasize integration and cross-boundary interactions that 
break down stereotypes, reduce biases, and destabilize workplace inequality. 
C. The Role of Law 
The social science research presented in this Part suggests that conscious 
consideration of race and sex in organizing work can serve as an important 
discrimination-reducing measure but that current considerations of race and 
sex are likely to entrench rather than disrupt discriminatory biases and 
stereotypes.  One response to this research might be to resist regulation of race- 
and sex-based decisions organizing work.  If we are confident that the equality 
implications of the research will have widespread normative appeal, then legal 
regulation (for example, prohibiting consideration of race or sex in organizing 
work) may only serve to inhibit voluntary efforts by employers to reshape the 
 
 71 See infra Part II.B.2.a (describing systemic efforts). 
 72 See id. 
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prevailing narrative and to reduce discrimination through race- or sex-based 
decisions organizing work.  At first glance, this option may seem possible 
because decisions organizing work can sometimes slide under the immediate 
radar of Title VII.  In this section, however, I illustrate that Title VII does 
reach decisions organizing work.  Moreover, I argue that the best course for 
attaining equality is to develop a comprehensive analysis of Title VII as it 
applies to decisions organizing work.  This latter argument has two parts.  
First, without such an analysis, race- and sex-based decisions organizing work 
are likely to leave women and minorities worse off than their white and male 
counterparts, particularly as the prevailing diversity discourse becomes more 
prominent and as white men bring claims of reverse discrimination.  Second, 
by reaching even a small number of race- and sex-based decisions organizing 
work, whether directly or indirectly, in claims brought by traditional plaintiffs 
or non-traditional ones, Title VII holds the potential to harness existing 
business interests for taking race and sex into account to trigger structural 
reforms that will make it more likely that race- and sex-based decisions 
organizing work will actually reduce discrimination. 
1. Reaching Decisions Organizing Work 
The “adverse employment action” requirement of Title VII presents a 
potential impediment to the law’s regulation of race- and sex-based decisions 
organizing work.  Most courts require a plaintiff to have suffered an adverse 
employment action before bringing a Title VII claim,73 and many courts have 
defined an adverse employment action as one that involves an “ultimate 
employment decision,” like hiring, discharge, or promotion.74  Some courts 
have construed the requirement more broadly, but even those courts require 
that the challenged decision have had an immediate material effect.75  Courts 
have held, for example, that a change in job title76 and a transfer from a 
position with “increased opportunities for overtime pay, more supervisory 
responsibilities, and additional perks, such as the use of a work-provided 
 
 73 See Minor v. Centocor, Inc., 457 F.3d 632, 634 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[H]undreds if not thousands of 
decisions say that an ‘adverse employment action’ is essential to the plaintiff’s prima facie case . . . .”). 
 74 See, e.g., McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 559–60 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (holding 
that only “ultimate employment decisions,” such as hiring and firing decisions, meet the “adverse employment 
action” requirement). 
 75 See Minor, 457 F.3d at 634 (explaining that employment decisions that do not have an immediate 
material effect are “not so central to the employment relation that they amount to discriminatory terms or 
conditions”). 
 76 E.g., Maclin v. SBC Ameritech, 520 F.3d 781, 789–90 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Grayson v. City of 
Chicago, 317 F.3d 745, 750 (7th Cir. 2003)). 
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cellular telephone, pager, vehicle, and parking space, as well as having most 
weekends and holidays off,”77 were not actionable under Title VII.  Similarly, 
some courts have held that being denied administrative support, access to 
training and leadership courses, and mentoring and training opportunities does 
not amount to an adverse employment action.78  Because the harms and 
benefits of decisions organizing work are often more difficult to discern, 
particularly at the moment of decision, than the harms and benefits of decisions 
at entry, exit, or promotion, we can expect that many decisions organizing 
work will not satisfy the adverse employment action requirement. 
Nonetheless, there is reason to believe that some decisions organizing work 
will meet the adverse action requirement.  Courts have held, for example, that 
assigning more or more burdensome work responsibilities is an adverse 
employment action.79  In one case, the court held that a journeyman electrician 
suffered an adverse employment action when he was assigned more strenuous 
overhead work, was required to work more with a toxic substance, and was 
given less varied work than co-workers.80  In another case, a court held that 
relocation of a scientist’s laboratory space met the requirement.81  Job transfers 
and denials of transfer requests have also been held to satisfy the adverse 
action requirement when a reasonable fact finder could find that the 
employee’s desired job was “materially more advantageous than the [undesired 
job], whether because of prestige, modernity, training opportunity, job 
security, or some other objective indicator of desirability.”82  Although these 
latter decisions focus on jobs rather than assignments within jobs, the same 
reasoning should apply when an individual is asked to take on additional work 
or is not assigned desirable work, such as working on a particularly prestigious 
team with substantial opportunities for client contact. 
More commonly, however, Title VII reaches decisions organizing work 
through causation.  Most courts—even those adhering to a relatively strict 
adverse action requirement—have been willing to reach back to earlier 
discriminatory decisions if those decisions caused an adverse employment 
 
 77 Nichols v. S. Ill. Univ.-Edwardsville, 510 F.3d 772, 780–81 (7th Cir. 2007) (discussing O’Neal v. City 
of Chicago, 392 F.3d 909 (7th Cir. 2004)). 
 78 E.g., Earle v. Aramark Corp., 247 F. App’x 519, 523 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam). 
 79 E.g., Davis v. Team Elec. Co., 520 F.3d 1080, 1089 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 80 Id. at 1090. 
 81 Chuang v. Univ. of Cal. Davis, 225 F.3d 1115, 1125–26 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 82 Beyer v. County of Nassau, 524 F.3d 160, 165 (2d Cir. 2008). 
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action.83  Slack v. Havens, an early Title VII case, serves as a textbook 
example of how causation analysis permits Title VII to reach decisions 
organizing work.84  In that case, four black women alleged that they were 
discriminatorily discharged because of their race in violation of Title VII.85  
The plaintiffs’ immediate supervisor, Ray Pohasky, had assigned them to 
general cleanup of the bonding and coating department and had excused a 
white co-worker from the janitorial-type work.86  The plaintiffs objected to 
doing the work, which they claimed was not in their job description.87  At 
some point during the interchange, Pohasky commented that “Colored people 
should stay in their places” and that “Colored folks are hired to clean because 
they clean better.”88  The plaintiffs were fired several days later for refusing to 
do the work.89  The employer argued that its decision to fire the women was 
not racially motivated, even if the assignment by Pohasky to clean the bonding 
and coating department was.90  The court rejected the argument, pointing out 
that the employer could not be allowed to divorce Pohasky’s discriminatory 
conduct from its own “so easily.”91  Rather, because “there was a definite 
causal relation between Pohasky’s apparently discriminatory conduct and the 
firings,” the firings themselves were discriminatory.92 
 
 83 See, e.g., EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L.A., 450 F.3d 476, 487 (10th Cir. 2006), cert. 
granted, 549 U.S. 1105 (2007), cert. dismissed, 549 U.S. 1334 (2007) (holding that BCI could be held liable 
for discrimination of an earlier decision maker if “the biased subordinate’s discriminatory reports, 
recommendation, or other actions caused the adverse employment action”); Dey v. Colt Constr. & Dev. Co., 
28 F.3d 1446, 1459 (7th Cir. 1994) (requiring that the plaintiff show “that an employee with discriminatory 
animus provided factual information or other input that may have affected the adverse employment action”).  
Some courts have required more than causation.  See, e.g., Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 
F.3d 277, 290–91 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (requiring that the ultimate decision maker be so influenced by the 
subordinate that “the subordinate is the actual decisionmaker”).  For an argument that the Supreme Court is 
likely to resolve the issue by adopting a causation standard, see Tristin K. Green, Insular Individualism: 
Employment Discrimination Law After Ledbetter v. Goodyear, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 353, 369–75 
(2008).  Although these recent cases involve different decision makers, the causation analysis should apply to 
cases involving the same decision maker as well. 
 84 Slack v. Havens, No. 72-59-GT, 1973 WL 339 (S.D. Cal. July 17, 1973).  The case is included as the 
first case in a popular employment discrimination casebook, MICHAEL ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS 
ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 2 (7th ed. 2008). 
 85 Slack, 1973 WL 339, at *1. 
 86 Id. at *1–2. 
 87 Id. at *2. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. at *5. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. at *5–6. 
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This issue has received renewed attention as courts have struggled to 
develop a doctrine that is responsive to concerns about attenuated causation in 
“subordinate bias” cases.93  Although the issue is still unresolved, courts are 
unlikely to settle on a standard that places all biased decisions that do not 
immediately satisfy the adverse employment action requirement entirely 
outside of Title VII’s purview.94  So long as courts continue to look to earlier 
decisions for the race- or sex-based determination that resulted in the later 
adverse action, decisions organizing work will remain within Title VII’s reach, 
even if they fail to satisfy the adverse employment action requirement 
themselves. 
As a practical matter, of course, many race- and sex-based decisions 
organizing work will not realistically be actionable.  Unlike Slack v. Havens, 
where the plaintiffs presented biased statements of the initial decision maker 
and the plaintiffs’ discharge followed closely on the heels of that decision,95 it 
will be difficult for most plaintiffs to prove that a discretionary decision 
organizing work, particularly one long past, was motivated by race or sex.  It 
will also be difficult for many plaintiffs to prove that a race- or sex-based 
decision caused the later adverse employment action.  Although one can 
imagine that extra work associated with interviews and pictures for publicity 
materials could play a role in a later decision not to promote, it is unlikely that, 
absent exceptional circumstances, the employee asked to take on that work 
would be able to prove the necessary causal link.96  Indeed, this reality 
underlies a longstanding critique of the adverse action requirement: It makes 
 
 93 Although the paradigmatic case involves the biased action of a subordinate to the ultimate decision 
maker, cases involving similar issues need not involve subordinate decision makers.  See Tristin K. Green, On 
Macaws and Employer Liability: A Response to Professor Zatz, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 107, 110–11 
(2009) (describing other possibilities). 
 94 To do so, after all, would shield a vast body of adverse actions from employment discrimination law.  
An employee who is given a poor evaluation motivated by racial bias, for example, would have no redress, 
even in the face of evidence that the evaluation was the sole basis for a later denial of promotion.  The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari in a case involving subordinate bias in 2007, but the case was dismissed 
upon settlement of the parties.  EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L.A., 450 F.3d 476 (10th Cir. 2006), 
cert. granted 549 U.S. 1105 (2007), cert. dismissed 549 U.S. 1334 (2007).  For a more in-depth description of 
the issue presented in these cases, see Green, supra note 83. 
 95 Slack, 1973 WL 339 at *1–2. 
 96 It may also take several decisions organizing work, accumulating over time, to cause an adverse 
employment action. 
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discrimination that occurs in day-to-day social relations difficult to address 
through individual disparate treatment law.97 
This said, the link between race- and sex-based decisions organizing work 
and an adverse employment action will sometimes be relatively clear.  Imagine 
a challenge to a manager’s decision to appoint a black woman to a prestigious 
work team when few black women work at the firm and a black woman has 
been appointed to the team for five consecutive years.  A white man who is not 
appointed to the team alleges that his later denial of promotion for “lack of 
prestigious appointments and connections with high-profile clients” resulted in 
part from the manager’s race-based decision not to place him on that team. 
Plaintiffs have also had some success in challenging decisions organizing 
work in the systemic context.  In Kosen v. American Express Financial 
Advisors, Inc., for example, the plaintiffs argued that sex-based discriminatory 
bias in client assignments caused a disparity in pay and promotion between 
men and women.98  A number of recent, high-profile class action lawsuits have 
similarly focused on discriminatory work assignments and their effect on 
mentoring and promotion opportunities as a factor in widespread disparities in 
promotions and pay.99 
The adverse action requirement, together with the difficulty of proving that 
any single decision was race or sex based, particularly a highly discretionary 
decision like one organizing work, means that Title VII will reach some, but 
not all, race- and sex-based decisions organizing work.  Decisions to tap a 
minority worker for publicity materials, to compose a racially diverse work 
team, or even to assign a woman to a hiring committee, are unlikely to see 
extended Title VII review.  Indeed, most race- and sex-based decisions will fly 
under the radar of Title VII in the sense that the individuals whose race or sex 
 
 97 See Green, supra note 57, at 116–17 (arguing that employees working in decentralized, more fluid 
work settings “will find it more difficult to satisfy [the adverse action requirement], and discrimination against 
this individual will go unaddressed”). 
 98 See Complaint at 9–20, Kosen v. Am. Express Fin. Advisors, Inc., No. 1:02-CV-00082-HHK (D.D.C. 
Jan. 17, 2002) (alleging that American Express maintained an informal system of choosing “superstars” from 
incoming recruits for training allotment, mentoring selection, and assignment of important leads and accounts 
that led to disparities in pay and promotion).  The parties in Kosen settled prior to trial.  Consent Decree at 2, 
Kosen v. Am. Express Fin. Advisors, Inc., No. 1:02-CV-00082-HHK (D.D.C. Jan. 23, 2002). 
 99 See generally Stender v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 803 F. Supp. 259, 332–34 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (involving 
assignment of women to various low-level jobs and the effect of those assignments on later promotions); 
Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 
458, 509–19 (2001) (describing the process and implementation of settlement in a case against Home Depot). 
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was taken into account will be unable to establish that his or her race or sex 
was a causal factor in an adverse employment action. 
This does not mean, however, that Title VII has no role to play in 
regulating consideration of race and sex in decisions organizing work—or that 
Title VII adequately polices the decisions that it currently reaches.  In the next 
section, I make the case for developing a comprehensive analysis of the 
permissibility of race- and sex-based decisions organizing work as a way of 
generating evenhanded scrutiny and harnessing the potential of existing 
business interests to advance workplace equality and reduce discrimination.  
Title VII need not reach all decisions organizing work to play this role. 
2. The Importance of Developing Title VII Law as It Applies to Decisions 
Organizing Work 
There are several reasons why it is important to develop a comprehensive 
analysis of Title VII as it applies to race- and sex-based decisions organizing 
work, even if few individuals harmed by decisions organizing work will 
ultimately be successful in a Title VII claim.  The first is reactive.  Without a 
comprehensive, reasoned analysis of Title VII as it applies to all considerations 
of race and sex in decisions organizing work, women and minorities who 
suffer work-related harms as a result of these decisions are likely to end up 
worse off than their white, male counterparts. 
The growing prominence of the business case for diversity makes it 
increasingly likely that reverse discrimination claims involving decisions 
organizing work will arise.100  As whites and men become aware of the value-
added diversity rhetoric—and perceive it as a substitute for other justifications 
for race- and sex-based decision making—they may challenge more 
employment decisions as being based on race or sex.101  In many cases, 
moreover, it will be easier for reverse discrimination plaintiffs to prove that a 
 
 100 See, e.g., Roger Clegg, President, Ctr. for Equal Opportunity, Statement to the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (Feb. 28, 2007) (transcript available at http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/meetings/2-
28-07/transcript.html) [hereinafter Statement of Roger Clegg] (arguing that the business case for diversity 
results in race-based decisions that harm whites).  The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Ricci reinforces this 
point.  See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2673–74 (2009) (holding that race-conscious decisions must 
be justified under Title VII, even when they do not result in a racial preference).  For discussion of this point in 
the constitutional context, see Michelle Adams, The Last Wave of Affirmative Action, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 1395. 
 101 See Statement of Roger Clegg, supra note 100; see also Kelly & Dobbin, supra note 1, at 971–73 
(identifying a rise in “diversity management” and a decline in “affirmative action”).  As diversity rhetoric 
becomes accepted within the business community, managers may also be more likely to express diversity-
based reasons for their decisions. 
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particular decision was motivated by race or sex.  Taking the earlier example 
of a law firm with few African-American associates, we can expect that regular 
appointment of an African-American associate to a prestigious committee, 
such as a recruitment committee, will look more suspicious (because it is less 
likely due to chance) than regular appointment of a white associate to the same 
committee. 
Perceptions about the harms and benefits of decisions organizing work are 
also likely to differ.  Because the business case for diversity has been framed 
as a benefit to women and minorities, workers as well as adjudicators are likely 
to more readily see harms to whites and men.  Moreover, race- and sex-based 
decisions pursuant to the “service” prong of the diversity narrative are likely to 
be consistent with stereotypes regarding group differences and, particularly at 
the level of organizing work, may therefore be viewed as natural rather than as 
something about which antidiscrimination law should be concerned. 
These realities, including the role that stereotyping is likely to play in 
claims and adjudication, expose the importance of understanding how Title VII 
guides managers’ voluntary, conscious use of race and sex in organizing work.  
Under the law as it is currently implemented, race- and sex-based decisions 
organizing work that are undertaken as business-enhancing measures—which 
are often stereotype confirming—will only rarely seem problematic, while 
similar decisions that harm men and whites will be heavily scrutinized. 
Along these same lines, developing Title VII law as it applies to decisions 
organizing work should highlight the reality that women and minorities can 
(and often do) bear costs pursuant to race- and sex-based decisions organizing 
work.  Currently, that reality tends to get buried beneath assumptions that race- 
and sex-based decisions made pursuant to the prevailing diversity discourse are 
always “affirmative action,” exhibiting preferences for members of 
traditionally subordinated groups.  This assumption can be problematic even at 
the level of entry, promotion, and exit, but it is particularly misplaced at the 
level of organizing work, where extra work is frequently expected of women 
and minorities even as they sometimes obtain benefits in the form of status or 
relational opportunities.  A woman who is assigned to a high-profile, 
prestigious team based on a client’s demands for diverse representation may 
bear a cost as well as a benefit from that assignment. 
The other reason to develop a comprehensive analysis of Title VII as it 
applies to decisions organizing work is more opportunistic and proactive.  As I 
have shown, the prevailing diversity discourse makes race and sex relevant in 
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organizing work as a business matter.  Firms perceive a bottom-line interest in 
making race- and sex-based decisions organizing work.  In the next Part, I 
argue that although Title VII permits race- and sex-based decisions organizing 
work that are intended to further the statute’s goal of reducing workplace 
discrimination, it does not permit race- and sex-based decisions organizing 
work that are intended solely to advance business interests.  As a practical 
matter, however, there is likely to be some overlap between these decisions.  In 
other words, some of the same decisions might serve business interests as well 
as Title VII’s statutory goals.  Placing an African-American man on a 
recruitment committee might simultaneously signal the firm’s adherence to 
egalitarian norms and reduce discrimination.  Similarly, assigning a Latino 
worker to a team charged with promoting a product for a Latino market might 
serve the firm’s business interest of reaching that market and, depending on the 
demographic makeup of the work team, reduce discrimination.  This overlap 
creates an opportunity for Title VII to harness the business interests already 
embraced by employers to advance antidiscrimination goals.  Indeed, because 
Title VII requires that even those race- and sex-based decisions that are 
intended to reduce discrimination be part of an employer’s broader effort to 
foster functional integration, employers may undertake those efforts as a way 
of obtaining deference to their race- and sex-based decisions organizing work.  
Those integrative efforts, in turn, are likely to serve bottom-line interests not 
only by reducing discrimination but also by generating cross-cultural 
competence and a context for interaction that enhances productivity, creativity, 
and job satisfaction.102 
In this way, the interpretation of Title VII presented here offers an 
untapped regulatory middle ground, an opportunity to reframe the narrative 
guiding the consideration of race and sex in decisions organizing work to 
foster workplace integration and reduce discrimination.  Even if reverse 
discrimination claims are likely to serve as the catalyst for legal analysis, 
women and people of color serve to benefit as much as white men from the 
development of an antidiscrimination law that encourages employers to take 
race and sex into account in organizing work in ways that will reduce 
discrimination rather than perpetuate it. 
 
 102 Indeed, these are some of the business interests cited in the corporate amicus briefs in Grutter.  See 
Amicus Curiae Brief of General Motors Corp., supra note 28, at 15–17. 
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II. DEVELOPING TITLE VII LAW AS IT APPLIES TO DECISIONS ORGANIZING 
WORK 
In this Part, I develop Title VII law governing the voluntary, conscious use 
of race and sex in organizing work.  I argue that race- and sex-conscious 
decisions organizing work are and should be permissible under Title VII if 
they are intended to reduce workplace discrimination and are part of a broader 
integrative effort by the employer to further that Title VII goal.  The law under 
this proposal acts most directly at the level of organizational policy making; it 
harnesses business interests for taking race and sex into account to serve the 
goals of Title VII.  But the effect of the law is likely to be felt more indirectly, 
in the reframing of the narrative that guides managerial consideration of race 
and sex in organizing work. 
Although the interpretation of Title VII that I present here is consistent with 
Supreme Court case law, it advances the law addressing conscious use of race 
and sex in employment decisions in two significant ways.  First, it expands the 
permissible justifications for race- and sex-based decisions to include the goal 
of reducing present and future discrimination, while tethering permissible 
justifications to the employment context.  In doing so, it resolves the question 
left open by the Supreme Court’s dismissal of certiorari in Taxman v. Board of 
Education of Piscataway103 in favor of deference, but it also diverges 
substantially from proposals made by legal scholars seeking to incorporate 
principles from Grutter v. Bollinger into the employment realm.  Second, it 
requires that race- and sex-based decisions that are intended to reduce 
discrimination be tied to systemic efforts by organizations to foster integration 
in work.  This second advancement builds directly on Supreme Court case law 
in the area and extends the requirement of a micro–macro link into the realm of 
decisions organizing work that are aimed at reducing discrimination. 
A. Furthering the Goals of Title VII 
To be permissible under Title VII, any use of race or sex in employment 
decisions must further the goals of the statute.  The Supreme Court has decided 
two principal cases in which it considered whether and under what 
circumstances Title VII permits an employer to make race- or sex-based 
 
 103 91 F.3d 1547 (3d. Cir. 1996) (en banc), cert. granted 521 U.S. 1117 (1997), cert. dismissed 522 U.S. 
1010 (1997) (addressing whether furtherance of a non-remedial Title VII goal can justify a race- or sex-based 
decision). 
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employment decisions.104  In each of those cases, the Court upheld the 
employer’s use of race and sex as permissible under Title VII. 
In its 1979 decision in United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, the Court 
upheld a collective bargaining plan negotiated between Kaiser Aluminum & 
Chemical Corp. and the United Steelworkers of America that reserved fifty 
percent of the openings in a Kaiser-sponsored craft training program for 
African Americans.105  African Americans had long been excluded from craft 
unions, which meant that they did not have the necessary credentials for craft 
work at Kaiser.106  At the time that Kaiser implemented the plan, less than two 
percent of Kaiser’s craft work force was African American, compared with 
thirty-nine percent of the local labor force.107  To increase the number of 
African Americans in craft positions, Kaiser and the union agreed that fifty 
percent of the openings for the Kaiser craft training program would be reserved 
for African Americans until the percentage of African-American craft workers 
at the Kaiser plant approximated the percentage of African Americans in the 
local labor force.108 
The Supreme Court in Weber held that Title VII does not forbid all 
consideration of race or sex in employment decisions.109  It also upheld 
Kaiser’s use of race in selecting applicants for the training program.110  In two 
short paragraphs, the Court explained why the Kaiser plan permitting 
consideration of race fell “on the permissible side of the line”: 
The purposes of the plan mirror those of the statute.  Both were 
designed to break down old patterns of racial segregation and 
hierarchy. Both were structured to “open employment opportunities 
for Negroes in occupations which have been traditionally closed to 
them.” 
At the same time, the plan does not unnecessarily trammel the 
interests of the white employees.  The plan does not require the 
discharge of white workers and their replacement with new black 
 
 104 The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009), falls outside of 
this category; it involved an employer’s decision not to certify test results based on the disparate impact that 
certification would have on minority firefighters, rather than a sex- or race-based employment decision 
regarding any individual employee.  Id. at 2664. 
 105 443 U.S. 193, 197 (1979). 
 106 Id. at 198–99. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. at 199. 
 109 Id. at 197. 
 110 Id. at 208. 
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hirees.  Nor does the plan create an absolute bar to the advancement 
of white employees; half of those trained in the program will be 
white.  Moreover, the plan is a temporary measure; it is not intended 
to maintain a racial balance, but simply to eliminate a manifest racial 
imbalance.111 
Less than ten years later, in Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara 
County, the Court upheld a city transportation agency plan that authorized 
consideration of the sex of qualified applicants in making promotions to 
positions within a traditionally segregated job classification in which women 
had been significantly underrepresented.112  The plaintiff in Johnson 
challenged the agency’s decision made pursuant to the plan to promote a 
woman instead of a man to the position of road dispatcher.113  Applying 
Weber, the Court held that to justify the use of race or sex as a factor in an 
employment decision there need only be a “manifest imbalance” in a 
traditionally segregated job category, not such an imbalance as would support 
a prima facie case of discrimination against the employer.114  Because there 
was a manifest imbalance in that case (of the 238 skilled craft jobs, not one 
was filled by a woman), and because the plan did not “unnecessarily trammel” 
the interests of the majority, the Court upheld the agency’s consideration of sex 
in the promotion decision.115 
The affirmative action plans at issue in both Weber and Johnson were 
remedial in the sense that they were intended to remedy the effects of past 
discrimination, whether carried out by the employer or by an entity closely 
affiliated with the employer.116  Although the Court did not require the 
employer in either Weber or Johnson to show that it had discriminated before it 
could take race or sex into account in employment decisions,117 the Court did 
emphasize in both cases that the plans were designed to “break down old 
patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy”118 and that the use of race or sex 
would end as soon as the percentage of African Americans or women in the 
job category mirrored the percentage of members of that group in the relevant 
 
 111 Id. (citation and footnote omitted) (quoting remarks of Sen. Humphrey, 110 CONG. REC. 6548 (1964)). 
 112 480 U.S. 616, 620–21 (1987). 
 113 Id. at 624–25. 
 114 Id. at 632. 
 115 Id. at 634–36. 
 116 Id. at 620–25; Weber, 443 U.S. at 197–99. 
 117 Johnson, 480 U.S. at 632; Weber, 443 U.S. at 211 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 118 Weber, 443 U.S. at 208 (majority opinion). 
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labor pool.119  This focus on addressing the effects of past discrimination, 
whether by the employer or by society in general, rendered the plans in Weber 
and Johnson at least loosely remedial. 
Although the use of race and sex in both Weber and Johnson was remedial, 
the Court did not foreclose race- or sex-conscious decision making to further 
non-remedial Title VII goals.  The most immediate non-remedial goal of Title 
VII is reducing present and future workplace discrimination.  In this section, I 
argue that race- and sex-based decisions organizing work can be justified under 
Title VII as means of reducing discrimination in the employer’s workplace but 
that they cannot be justified as means either of furthering the business reasons 
that underlie the prevailing narrative or of advancing social equality directly.  
In the remainder of this Part, I delineate the contours of a permissible plan for 
taking race or sex into account in organizing work. 
1. Reducing Workplace Discrimination 
Reducing discrimination in the workplace is a primary goal of Title VII.  
As the Supreme Court stated in one of its early Title VII decisions, “The 
language of Title VII makes plain the purpose of Congress to assure equality of 
employment opportunities and to eliminate those discriminatory practices and 
devices which have fostered racially stratified job environments to the 
disadvantage of minority citizens.”120  More recently, the Court has relied on 
the goal of reducing workplace discrimination in shaping the law of vicarious 
liability and the law of punitive damages under Title VII.  In Burlington 
Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, for example, the Court held that when applied to 
claims of harassment, the agency principles governing vicarious liability in the 
Restatement Second of Agency should be modified to serve Title VII’s “basic 
policies of encouraging forethought by employers and saving action by 
objecting employees.”121  And in Kolstad v. American Dental, which held that 
 
 119 Johnson, 480 U.S. at 640; Weber, 443 U.S. at 208–09.  In Weber, the comparison was to the local 
labor force because of the longstanding exclusion of blacks from craft unions.  Id. at 208–09 (“Preferential 
selection of craft trainees at the Gramercy plant will end as soon as the percentage of black skilled 
craftworkers in the Gramercy plant approximates the percentage of blacks in the local labor force.”). 
 120 McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973); see also Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 
422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975) (stating that “the primary objective [of Title VII] was a prophylactic one”). 
 121 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998); see also Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805–06 (1998) (explaining 
that it created the defense because the primary objective of Title VII is “not to provide redress but to avoid 
harm” and explaining that “[i]t would . . . implement clear statutory policy and complement the Government’s 
Title VII enforcement efforts to recognize the employer’s affirmative obligation to prevent violations and give 
credit here to employers who make reasonable efforts to discharge their duty”). 
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employers should not be liable for punitive damages based on discriminatory 
decisions by employees when those decisions are “contrary to the employer’s 
good faith efforts to comply with Title VII,” the Court explained that the 
statute’s “primary objective is a prophylactic one; it aims, chiefly, not to 
provide redress but to avoid harm.”122 
The case law is less clear about whether furthering the goal of reducing 
workplace discrimination justifies race- and sex-consciousness in decision 
making.  In Taxman v. Board of Education of Piscataway, the majority of a 
Third Circuit en banc court held that the only justification for race- or sex-
conscious decision making that can satisfy Title VII is a remedial one.123  
Under this view, any use of race or sex must be aimed at “remedying the 
results of any prior discrimination [by the defendant organization] or identified 
underrepresentation of minorities [within the organization].”124 
Taxman involved a mandatory lay off of teachers in the Township of 
Piscataway, New Jersey school district.125  The town had adopted a policy 
aimed at providing “equal educational opportunity for students and equal 
employment opportunity for employees and prospective employees.”126  The 
policy provided that minority status would serve as a tie-breaker between 
candidates of equal qualification.127  In 1989, the school board was faced with 
the task of laying off a teacher in the business department at Piscataway High 
School.128  Debra Williams, a black woman, and Sharon Taxman, a white 
woman, both taught in the department and had exactly the same seniority.129  
The board determined that they were “‘two teachers of equal ability’ and 
‘equal qualifications.’”130  Invoking the town policy to break the tie, the board 
 
Although the Court in Burlington Industries relied on the prophylactic goal of Title VII, that goal 
neither required nor necessarily justified cutting back on vicarious liability.  See Green, supra note 83, at 359–
60 (describing Burlington Industries as resting on a belief that individual and employer interests with respect 
to discrimination have diverged). 
 122 527 U.S. 526, 545–46 (1999) (quoting Albermarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 417, and Faragher, 524 U.S. at 
806 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 123 91 F.3d 1547, 1557 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc), cert. granted 521 U.S. 1117 (1997), cert. dismissed 522 
U.S. 1010 (1997) 
 124 Id. at 1550. 
 125 Id. at 1551. 
 126 Id. at 1550. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. at 1551. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. 
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voted to lay off Taxman.131  Theodore H. Kruse, the board’s president, 
explained his vote to apply the policy in terms of the educational benefits that 
derive from diversity in a teaching staff.132 
The Third Circuit in Taxman decided that because neither the school 
district’s affirmative action plan nor the board president’s diversity rationale 
furthered the remedial purpose of Title VII, the board’s consideration of race in 
the decision to lay off Taxman violated Title VII.133  According to the court, if 
Title VII had been designed only to eradicate discrimination—and not to 
remedy the consequences of prior discrimination—no race- or sex-conscious 
decisions would be permitted.134  Because taking an individual’s race or sex 
into account in an employment decision is itself discriminatory, and therefore 
violates Title VII’s nondiscrimination mandate, it can only be justified by the 
furtherance of another Title VII goal.135  As Judge Mansmann, writing for the 
majority, stated: 
The significance of this second corrective purpose cannot be 
overstated.  It is only because Title VII was written to eradicate not 
only discrimination per se but the consequences of prior 
discrimination as well, that racial preferences in the form of 
affirmative action can co-exist with the Act’s antidiscrimination 
mandate.136 
What the Third Circuit in Taxman misses is that taking race or sex into 
account in a particular decision, while violating Title VII’s nondiscrimination 
mandate with respect to a single individual, can further a much broader and 
more pervasive reduction in workplace discrimination.  Indeed, as the research 
in Part I shows, taking race and sex into account in organizing work can be a 
 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. at 1551–52.  In deposition testimony, Kruse provided the following explanation for his vote: 
Basically I think because I had been aware that the student body and the community which is our 
responsibility, the schools of the community, is really quite diverse and there—I have a general 
feeling during my tenure on the board that it was valuable for the students to see in the various 
employment roles a wide range of background, and that it was also valuable to the work force 
and in particular to the teaching staff that they have—they see that in each other. 
Id.  It is possible that Kruse intended to articulate a discrimination-reducing rationale with the latter part of his 
explanation, but he did not elaborate.  See id. at 1552 (elaborating upon further questions on the “educational 
objective”). 
 133 Id. at 1557–58. 
 134 Id. at 1557. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. 
GREEN GALLEYSFINAL 6/10/2010  1:49 PM 
620 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59 
particularly effective tool for reducing biases and stereotypes in day-to-day 
decision making and interaction at work.137  If by taking race or sex into 
account in an employment decision the employer aims to advance this broader 
goal—to reduce the incidence of decisions based on racial or gender bias 
within the workplace as a whole—then the employer’s purpose mirrors the 
purposes of Title VII. 
Applied to decisions organizing work, this interpretation of Title VII means 
that minorities as well as whites and women as well as men may bear a cost for 
the advancement of the statute’s broader nondiscrimination goals.  When the 
only black lawyer in a law firm is assigned to staff a work-intensive case, to 
attend recruitment dinners for multiple minority job candidates, and to serve 
regularly on the firm’s diversity committee, she may bear various costs.  
Similarly, when a minority firefighter or sales representative or line worker at 
an automobile manufacturing plant is asked to perform particular “signaling” 
or other work because of her race or sex, she may bear various costs.  Even if 
the employer in each of these instances is required to compensate the employee 
for extra work (and I argue that it should be), in many cases the woman or 
minority is likely nonetheless to suffer residual costs, particularly because of 
the difficulty in discerning the precise nature and extent of the costs imposed, 
including those associated with identity. 
Focusing on the antisubordination underpinning of Title VII helps make 
clear why the imposition of this cost on individual women and people of color 
can be justified as a means of reducing discrimination more broadly within the 
employer’s workplace, just as similar costs can be justified when they are 
imposed on men or whites as a means of reducing discrimination or, more 
traditionally, as a means of correcting a “manifest imbalance” in a particular 
job category.  In both cases, individuals are expected to bear costs for the sake 
of a statutorily identified broader goal.  The statute seeks to alleviate the 
economic and social subordination of traditionally subordinated groups by 
reducing discrimination in employment,138 and research suggests that race- and 
sex-based decisions organizing work can further that goal.139  Just as in the 
traditional affirmative action context, moreover, if there were reason to believe 
that permitting individual race- and sex-based decisions that impose costs on 
 
 137 See supra Part I.B. 
 138 See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 202–04 (1979) (describing the goals of Title 
VII). 
 139 See supra Part I.B. 
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women and people of color would translate into increased discrimination or 
subordination within the workplace or in society more generally, then the law’s 
approach to those decisions should be reconsidered.140 
2. Other Business Reasons 
It should be relatively clear by now that the business interests pursued 
under the prevailing narrative—including serving markets and signaling 
fairness and diversity—do not justify race- and sex-based decisions under Title 
VII.  The interests themselves may be legitimate, but Title VII requires that 
employers find ways of furthering those interests without taking race or sex 
into account in employment decisions or by taking race and sex into account in 
ways that simultaneously further Title VII’s broader statutory goals. 
This point is in some tension with several recent circuit court cases 
analyzing race-conscious decisions under the Equal Protection Clause.  In 
these cases, courts have held that the Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit 
consideration of race when it is used to further the mission of a prison or the 
efficacy of a police force.141  Wittmer v. Peters involved a state-run prison boot 
camp designed “to give the inmates an experience similar to that of old-
fashioned military basic training.”142  The camp security staff consisted of 
forty-eight correctional officers, three captains, and ten lieutenants; sixty-eight 
percent of the camp’s two hundred inmates were black.143  The Illinois 
Department of Corrections considered race as a factor in its decision to appoint 
a black man to the lieutenant position.144  It argued that consideration of race 
was needed and constitutionally permissible “because the black inmates are 
believed unlikely to play the correctional game of brutal drill sergeant and 
brutalized recruit unless there are some blacks in authority in the camp.”145 
 
 140 See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika: Intergroup Relations After Affirmative 
Action, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1251, 1251 (1998) (considering whether the group harms associated with affirmative 
action in education outweigh the group benefits). 
 141 Because the recent cases illustrating this distinction between affirmative action analysis under Title 
VII and under the Equal Protection Clause have involved race, I focus here on race.  There are several 
differences between the race and sex contexts.  First, the Supreme Court has applied a less exacting level of 
scrutiny to decisions based on sex than to decisions based on race.  See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 
515, 534 (1996) (requiring an “exceedingly persuasive justification” in the context of sex discrimination).  
Second, Title VII’s BFOQ provision includes sex, but not race.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2006). 
 142 87 F.3d 916, 917 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 143 Id. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. at 920. 
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Decisions based on race must survive strict scrutiny review to be lawful 
under the Equal Protection Clause.146  Under strict scrutiny review, the 
government’s use of race must further a “compelling governmental interest[]” 
and be “narrowly tailored” to that interest.147  Even without addressing what 
constitutes narrow tailoring, the compelling interests permitted under the Equal 
Protection Clause may be broader than those permitted under Title VII.  In 
Wittmer, for example, the Seventh Circuit held that the success of the prison 
boot camp constituted a compelling government interest, and the preference 
afforded the black man in appointing him to the position of lieutenant was 
narrowly tailored to that interest.148  Similarly, in Petit v. City of Chicago, the 
Seventh Circuit held that the Chicago Police Department “had a compelling 
interest in a diverse population at the rank of sergeant in order to set the proper 
tone in the department and to earn the trust of the community, which in turn 
increases police effectiveness in protecting the city.”149  In both of these cases, 
the court pointed to the efficacy of the employer’s program as the ground for 
permitting race- or sex-conscious decision making.150 
These cases may represent a movement in constitutional law toward 
deference to race- and sex-based decision making in employment, at least in 
some circumstances.  Regardless of whether the courts in these cases are 
correct about the permissible scope of race- and sex-based decision making 
under the Equal Protection Clause, however, the cases say little about Title 
VII.151  Title VII does not ask whether the use of race or sex serves a 
compelling government interest.  Instead, it requires that race- and sex-
conscious decisions further the goals of the statute.  The employer’s interest in 
best serving the client or in enhancing safety comes into a Title VII analysis 
under the bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) defense, and, as others 
have argued before me, regulators (and courts) should be wary of expanding 
what is now a very narrow exception to the general prohibition on the use of 
race and sex in employment decisions.152 
 
 146 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). 
 147 Id. 
 148 Wittmer, 87 F.3d at 920.  
 149 Petit v. City of Chicago, 352 F.3d 1111, 1115 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 150 Id.; Wittmer, 87 F.3d at 920. 
 151 The court in Petit relied in part on Grutter as a basis for its analysis.  Petit, 352 F.3d at 1114.  For an 
argument that Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007), 
rendered the Seventh Circuit’s view of Grutter less tenable, see Michelle Adams, Stifling the Potential of 
Grutter v. Bollinger: Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 88 B.U. L. REV. 
937 (2008). 
 152 See Frymer & Skrentny, supra note 10. 
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3. Social Equality 
Understanding the narrow limits that Title VII places on the use of race and 
sex in employment decisions also helps unravel why Taxman was correctly 
decided, even if the Third Circuit’s rationale and its broad pronouncement that 
Title VII permits only remedial justifications for race-based decisions are 
wrong.  The rationale put forward by the school district in Taxman for taking 
race into account can be construed in several ways.  It can be construed as a 
matter of serving the district’s clients—the students—raising all of the 
concerns about the use of race and sex to serve clients already discussed.  It 
can also be construed more explicitly as a way of advancing social equality.  
Research shows that black students are more likely to succeed if they are 
exposed to black teachers.153  Seeing blacks in positions of power can lower 
implicit biases and stereotyping in both non-black and black students and can 
alter behavior accordingly.154  Having more successful black students graduate 
from high school advances not only the interests of those students but also the 
broader goal of social equality.  Similarly, by sending into society students of 
all colors who are less biased and better able to interact comfortably with 
members of different racial groups, the school district reduces group 
subordination, stigmatization, and intergroup hostility—the hallmarks of 
inequality—in society at large. 
Along these lines, a number of legal scholars have argued that Title VII 
might be interpreted to permit employers to take race or sex into account in 
employment decisions if those decisions further broader societal interests.  
Professors Jerry Kang and Mahzarin Banaji make this claim in their article, 
Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of “Affirmative Action.”155  
They argue that an employer should be permitted under Title VII to hire an 
Asian professor “partly to decrease bias against Asians among business school 
students.”156  According to Kang and Banaji, the employer’s objective to “stop 
discrimination by decreasing the implicit bias in students, who will graduate to 
become future workers, employers, and leaders” is “consonant with the goals 
of Title VII, even as narrowly interpreted in Taxman.”157  Professor Cynthia 
Estlund makes a similar, though slightly more nuanced, claim in her article, 
 
 153 See generally Kang & Banaji, supra note 12, at 1106–09 (discussing research underlying support of 
“debiasing” agents). 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. at 1111. 
 157 Id. at 1114–15; see also id. at 1111–12 (relying on Grutter). 
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Putting Grutter to Work.158  She argues that “Grutter’s recognition of the civil 
and societal value of integrated institutions” provides reason to read Title VII 
to permit an employer to address a “manifest imbalance in a predominately 
white workplace or job” regardless of the employer’s reason for doing so.159  
Estlund expects that in this way the Grutter reasoning can open Title VII to 
permit integrationist efforts by employers, even if those efforts are not aimed at 
remedying past discrimination like the efforts approved by the Court in Weber 
and Johnson.160 
It is tempting to join these scholars in seeking to interpret Title VII to 
permit race- and sex-conscious decision making aimed at furthering social 
equality directly, for such an interpretation would allow employers substantial 
leeway to take race or sex into account.  Social equality is unquestionably an 
end goal of antidiscrimination laws, including Title VII, and the utilization of 
affirmative action in a variety of work contexts could go a long way toward 
easing the subordination and stigmatization suffered by women and people of 
color for generations in this country. 
But this deference approach is problematic, not only because it would leave 
employers free to make race- or sex-based decisions pursuant to the prevailing 
narrative.  There are at least two additional reasons why Title VII should limit 
consideration of race or sex in organizing work to those decisions that are 
aimed at furthering the goal of social equality through reduced workplace 
discrimination rather than through some other means, such as client exposure 
to a diverse workforce or student exposure to a diverse faculty.  Both of these 
reasons are based firmly in the text and goals of Title VII.  The first is broadly 
normative and may be applicable to all employment decisions; the second is 
more practical and may be specific to decisions organizing work. 
Title VII is the employment provision of the Civil Rights Act,161 and as 
such it emphasizes the goal of reducing employment discrimination as a means 
of reducing economic and social subordination.162  Title VII does sometimes 
impose a cost on employers for society’s wrongs.  The most basic example can 
 
 158 Estlund, supra note 10. 
 159 Id. at 35–36. 
 160 Id.  Professor Estlund also makes this argument in her book, Working Together, where she 
acknowledges the difficulty that Title VII’s antidiscrimination mandate poses.  CYNTHIA ESTLUND, WORKING 
TOGETHER: HOW WORKPLACE BONDS STRENGTHEN A DIVERSE DEMOCRACY 147–49 (2003). 
 161 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006). 
 162 See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (explaining that Title VII was “designed 
to break down old patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy”). 
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be found in disparate impact theory, which requires employers to alter 
employment practices that have a disparate impact on members of a protected 
group, even if that impact is caused by inferior access to education or other 
resources.163  Taking race or sex into account in organizing work, however, 
places a cost directly on individuals, and that cost, as the court in Taxman 
pointed out, violates the narrow nondiscrimination mandate of Title VII by 
virtue of its being race or sex based.  In this way, an employer’s use of race or 
sex in organizing work violates individuals’ rights under the Act.  But while 
Congress in Title VII specifically encourages employers to take steps to reduce 
discrimination in their workplaces (therefore justifying the imposition of race- 
and sex-based costs on individuals in some circumstances), it does not 
encourage efforts that solely advance societal interests, whether in the form of 
reduced subordination or a healthier democracy.164  Instead, societal interests, 
at least when race- and sex-based employment decisions are involved, must be 
advanced through reduced discrimination in employment. 
Nor has the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Title VII opened the door to 
the use of race or sex in workplace decision making as a means of advancing 
social equality directly.  In Weber and in Johnson, the Court held that Title VII 
permits employers to take race and sex into account in employment decisions 
as a means of remedying a manifest racial or gender imbalance between the 
employer’s workforce and the relevant labor pool.165  At first glance, this 
seems to support the use of race and sex in employment decisions as a means 
of directly furthering social equality.  After all, in Weber, the employer was 
responding to the union’s longstanding exclusion of blacks from the craft 
union, not to its own discrimination against blacks.166  And in Johnson, the 
Court stressed that the employer need not have caused the underrepresentation 
of women that it sought to remedy.167  However, the remedial nature of the use 
 
 163 See Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642, 647 (2001); see 
also Green, supra note 13, at 877–79 (distinguishing cases in which disparate impact theory operates as an 
antidiscrimination mandate from those in which disparate impact theory operates as an accommodation 
mandate, requiring employers to bear a cost for society’s wrongs). 
 164 I agree here with Professor Yelnosky, who argues that a “prevention justification” fares better than a 
societal justification “in light of the existing statutory framework in which America’s employers operate.”  
Yelnosky, supra note 12, at 1416. 
 165 Weber, 443 U.S. at 208; Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 631–32 (1987). 
 166 Weber, 443 U.S. at 198. 
 167 Johnson, 480 U.S. at 634 n.12 (quoting the court of appeals for the proposition that “[a] plethora of 
proof is hardly necessary to show that women are generally underrepresented in such positions and that strong 
social pressures weigh against their participation”).  Justice O’Connor, whose concurrence supplied the sixth 
vote to uphold the program, objected to the Johnson majority’s failure to require a tighter remedial connection.  
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of race and sex in Weber and Johnson brought the plans within the bounds of 
the employment statute.168  The requirement of a manifest imbalance in a 
traditionally segregated job category ensures that a race or sex preference will 
break down racial segregation and hierarchy in employment.169  If the 
defendant in either case had a proportional representation of blacks or women 
in the targeted job category, even if society as a whole had engaged in or 
continued to engage in subordination of those groups in those job categories, 
the plans would not have satisfied Title VII. 
Requiring that race- and sex-conscious decisions further the Title VII goal 
of reducing workplace discrimination also serves to limit employer discretion 
in a way that makes it more likely that race- or sex-conscious decisions 
organizing work will actually serve the broader social equality goal of the 
statute.  One of the primary objections to social equality as a permissible 
justification for race- or sex-based decision making is its open-endedness and 
lack of measurable goals.170  Although measuring whether consideration of 
race and sex in organizing work is serving to reduce employment 
discrimination in an organization is admittedly difficult (more difficult, for 
instance, than measuring whether specific numerical goals have been met), it is 
much easier to monitor the efficacy of discrimination-reducing measures in a 
workplace than in society as a whole.  With a more limited goal—reduced 
workplace discrimination—comes greater possibility for meaningful oversight. 
Indeed, the need for a focus on reducing discrimination in employment 
decisions (rather than on attaining the benefits of integration for society as a 
whole) is particularly urgent in the context of organizing work.  When it comes 
to organizing work, the benefits and/or harms of any particular decision are 
difficult to discern.  As discussed in Part I, a black man who is assigned to a 
particular work team as a way of adding diversity to an otherwise all-white or 
 
Id. at 654 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  She concurred only because she found a “statistical disparity sufficient 
to support a prima facie claim under Title VII.”  Id. at 649. 
 168 Weber, 443 U.S. at 201; Johnson, 480 U.S. at 620. 
 169 With its adherence to a manifest imbalance requirement, Professor Estlund’s proposal does come back 
around to employment, despite her broader arguments about permitting race- and sex-based decisions to 
address social inequality directly.  For more discussion of this requirement, see infra Part II.B.2.b.  In the 
context of entry and promotion decisions, in contrast to decisions organizing work, it should be relatively clear 
whether a member of a traditionally subordinated group is being provided a benefit. 
 170 See, e.g., Taxman v. Bd. of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547, 1564 (3d. Cir. 1996) (expressing concern that use of 
race and sex in layoff decisions was “devoid of goals” and led to standardless determinations “governed 
entirely by the Board’s whim”); see also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986) 
(expressing concern that permitting race-based decision making to remedy societal discrimination or to 
provide role models for students is too “amorphous”). 
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racially skewed team may suffer harm in the form of extra work that his white 
counterparts are not similarly asked to undertake or in the form of a less 
desirable work assignment.171  Although this cost may be justified by a broader 
reduction in discrimination, limiting permissible interests to the Title VII 
interest of reducing discrimination in the employer organization makes it more 
likely that the individuals who bear the immediate and direct cost of race- and 
sex-based decisions organizing work will also recognize the broader benefits 
of those decisions. 
The requirement that any use of race and sex be aimed at furthering the 
goal of reducing employment discrimination will constrain the use of race and 
sex in some instances.  It will be difficult for employers to successfully argue, 
for example, that assigning a Latino man to a predominately Latino-staffed 
sales division serving a Latino market furthers the Title VII goal of reducing 
workplace discrimination.  In many cases, though, race- or sex-based decisions 
may simultaneously be good for business and further the goal of reducing 
discrimination.  Retaining a black teacher in the business department, for 
example, may simultaneously reduce discrimination in employment decisions 
regarding other teachers and staff within the district and further social equality 
by exposing students to a diverse range of teachers in the business department.  
Similarly, asking an Asian employee to be interviewed and photographed for 
an internally and externally circulated publicity document may reduce 
discrimination in employment decisions by fostering a culture that values 
integration at the same time that it improves the firm’s image on diversity 
matters with clients and applicants.172  In this way, employers may be able to 
achieve many of their business goals while also furthering the goals of Title 
VII. 
This reality opens the door to the harnessing potential of Title VII in this 
context.  Race- and sex-based decisions that are permissible under Title VII 
need not be perceived as counterproductive to business.  To the contrary, the 
narrative as reshaped by Title VII should make clear that taking race and sex 
into account in decisions organizing work can serve business interests and 
 
 171 See supra Part I.A.  At the same time, he may benefit from opportunities to interact with powerful 
people and from the prestige of the assignment.  Even these benefits, however, will be highly context-
dependent and may be nonexistent or outweighed by the costs in a particular case. 
 172 Similarly, the school district in Taxman could argue that having a black teacher in the otherwise all-
white business division furthers the goal of reducing discrimination against teachers.  The board president in 
Taxman may have tried to do this in explaining his vote.  See supra note 132. 
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simultaneously foster integration that reduces discrimination and inequality in 
work.173 
B. Drawing a Micro–Macro Link: An Integrative Effort 
Accepting that a decision taking race or sex into account in organizing 
work can be justified by furtherance of the goals of Title VII, the law still 
needs some way of ensuring that each race- or sex-conscious decision is likely 
to further those goals.  When the use of race or sex is meant to serve Title 
VII’s remedial goals, like in Weber and Johnson, the link between the decision 
imposing a race- or sex-based cost on an individual and Title VII’s broader 
remedial goal is established by the employer’s showing of a “manifest 
imbalance” in a traditionally segregated job category.174  The employer makes 
this showing by comparing the racial or gender makeup of the employer’s 
workforce or job category with the racial or gender makeup of the relevant 
labor pool.175  If this comparison reflects a manifest imbalance in the racial or 
gender demographics of a particular job category, then the employer is 
justified in taking race or sex into account in hiring, firing, or promotion 
decisions involving that category until a better demographic balance is 
attained.176  The manifest imbalance requirement of Weber and Johnson 
therefore ensures that the use of race or sex in any individual decision furthers 
the Title VII goal of “break[ing] down old patterns of racial segregation and 
hierarchy” by altering the racial or gender demographics of the job category in 
question.177 
In much the same way, the micro decisions taking race or sex into account 
in organizing work should link to the macro goal of reducing discrimination in 
the workplace.  I begin this section by exploring in more depth the idea of a 
micro–macro link under Title VII and the implications of such a requirement.  
I then propose that the micro–macro link be established by a showing that any 
 
 173 Indeed, considering race and sex in order to reduce discrimination as part of a broader integrative 
effort is also likely to serve the “cross-cultural competence” argument made by major corporations in Grutter.  
See supra note 28. 
 174 Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 637 (1987); United Steel Workers of Am. v. Weber, 443 
U.S. 193, 208–09 (1979). 
 175 Weber represents a divergence from the usual comparison because the pool from which the defendant 
drew its qualified workers had been skewed by years of discrimination against blacks.  443 U.S. at 208–09 
(describing the relevant comparison as between the job category and the local labor force). 
 176 See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 637; Weber, 443 U.S. at 208–09. 
 177 Weber, 443 U.S. at 195, 208. 
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particular race- or sex-based decision is part of a comprehensive integrative 
effort by the employer. 
1. Requiring a Micro–Macro Link: Statutory Limits and Normative 
Underpinnings 
Requiring a micro–macro link—a link between a race- or sex-conscious 
decision and furtherance of a broader Title VII nondiscrimination goal—helps 
to set some limits on employer use of race and sex in workplace decisions and 
to ensure that the cost imposed on individuals for race- and sex-based 
decisions actually furthers that Title VII goal.  Before considering what the 
micro–macro link might look like in the context of organizing work, I consider 
why a micro–macro link is necessary.  I have shown that the defendants in 
Weber and Johnson both established such a link by identifying a manifest 
imbalance in a traditionally segregated job category.178  But this does not 
answer the normative question: Why should we require such a link?  Or, put 
another way: Does Title VII require that any race- or sex-based cost imposed 
on an individual do more than avoid a single instance of discrimination? 
Cognitive bias research on the influence of implicit biases and perception 
of biases on decision making and interactions provides the foundation for a 
good illustration of this question.  The cognitive bias research suggests that 
placing a black man on an otherwise all-white interview panel will reduce the 
biases of the panel members and alter the context of the interaction between a 
black applicant and the panel so that the panel’s decision is less likely to be 
influenced by discriminatory biases.179  If the black man is assigned to the 
interview panel, he may bear a cost in the form of extra work or time taken 
away from tasks that would better further his career.  The black man 
interviewed by the panel, on the other hand, is likely to attain a benefit in the 
form of a panel decision that is less likely to be influenced by discriminatory 
biases.  Does Title VII permit the employer to assign the black employee to the 
panel as a way of reducing the likelihood that the panel’s decision will be 
influenced by discriminatory bias? 
In his article, Perceptual Segregation, Professor Russell Robinson answers 
“yes.”180  Drawing on research showing that blacks and whites as well as 
women and men tend to perceive discrimination differently and that these 
 
 178 See supra notes 117–19 and accompanying text. 
 179 See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 180 Robinson, supra note 8, at 1177–79. 
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differing perceptions alter interactions in ways that disadvantage blacks and 
women, he argues that firms should assign a “critical mass” of black 
interviewers to a committee interviewing a black candidate.181  He also argues 
that firms should take similar measures in staffing committees that handle 
promotion decisions and internal equal opportunity matters.182 
In considering the possibility that an employer’s use of race or sex in 
staffing these committees will violate Title VII, Robinson points out that 
describing a decision as providing a racial or gender “preference” implies that 
it favors or privileges an outsider (a woman or a person of color) and 
disadvantages an insider (a man or a white person).  He rightly emphasizes that 
in many cases the assignment will actually “burden[] outsiders who may have 
to conduct more interviews and sit on more committees than they otherwise 
would.”183  Cases are also sure to arise, however, in which being a member of 
the interviewing committee is prestigious or otherwise presents a valuable 
opportunity to network and build social capital with important people—think 
of a law faculty and the appointments committee.  In those cases, the 
assignment of a black man over a white man to the committee on the basis of 
his race will amount at least in part to a racial “preference,” potentially 
triggering a reverse discrimination claim. 
Moreover, even if these assignments do consistently burden women and 
minorities, never providing benefits, the law should still be concerned with 
race- or sex-conscious employment decisions, probably even more so.  
Robinson recognizes this point when he calls on employers “to formalize their 
policies and give outsiders credit for performing this vital debiasing work.”184  
But a call for credit or compensation alone is unlikely to be as effective as he 
suggests.  The “soft” nature of the benefits and harms associated with decisions 
organizing work, after all, make it difficult to discern when an assignment to a 
particular committee warrants extra credit or provides a welcome opportunity.  
And one man’s opportunity may be another man’s burden. 
What, then, of the equality analysis?  To answer this question, it helps to 
think again of the reasoning that the Third Circuit provided in Taxman for its 
conclusion that Title VII permits only those race- or gender-based decisions 
 
 181 Id. at 1173. 
 182 Id. at 1170, 1173. 
 183 Id. at 1179. 
 184 Id.  Similarly, I suggest the requirement that an integrative effort incorporate processes to compensate 
(in a broad sensed) individuals for this work.  See infra note 196 and accompanying text. 
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that are aimed at remedying past discrimination.185  According to the court, 
once the antidiscrimination mandate is violated by a race- or sex-based 
decision, it can only be justified by furtherance of another Title VII goal.186  “It 
is only because Title VII was written to eradicate not only discrimination per 
se but the consequences of prior discrimination as well,” the court explained, 
“that racial preferences in the form of affirmative action can co-exist with the 
Act’s antidiscrimination mandate.”187  As I argue above, this reasoning 
mistakenly equates violation of the nondiscrimination mandate in isolation 
with violation of the nondiscrimination mandate in total.  A single sex- or race-
based decision may be justified, in other words, by furtherance of a more 
pervasive reduction in workplace discrimination. 
A natural extension of this argument is that a race- or sex-based decision 
like the one proposed by Professor Robinson188 cannot be justified by the 
possibility of preventing discrimination in a single instance.  Even if assigning 
a black man to an interview committee reduces the likelihood that 
discriminatory bias will infect the hiring decision regarding a black applicant, 
using race in organizing work in that way violates Title VII if it was not 
intended to (and was not likely to) further the broader antidiscrimination 
goal.189  This is true whether the individual bearing a cost is the white 
employee who was not assigned to the committee or the black employee who 
was assigned to the committee.  The importance of furthering broader Title VII 
goals is even more salient, however, once we recognize that the black 
employee assigned to the committee may bear a cost.  In that case, the 
antidiscrimination mandate of Title VII has been violated, and the goal of 
reducing economic and social subordination has been undermined. 
This realization reinforces the point that there must be some link between 
individual race- or sex-conscious employment decisions and furtherance of 
Title VII’s goals.  A micro–macro link ties individual decisions to the statute’s 
broader antidiscrimination goals and ensures that individual race-or sex-based 
decisions are likely to further those goals.  In Weber and Johnson, the link was 
established by the employer’s showing of a manifest imbalance in the racial or 
 
 185 Taxman v. Twp. of Piscataway, 91 F.3d 1547, 1557 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc). 
 186 Id. 
 187 Id. 
 188 See supra text accompanying notes 181 & 182.  
 189 The same is true if the employer is attempting to avoid Title VII liability by assigning a black man to 
the committee.  See supra Part I.A.and accompanying text (discussing business reasons for taking race and sex 
into account in organizing work). 
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gender makeup of a traditionally segregated job category.190  In the next 
section, I consider how an employer might establish a similar link for decisions 
organizing work aimed at furthering the goal of reducing workplace 
discrimination. 
2. Establishing a Micro–Macro Link 
Social science research teaches that attention to race and sex in decision 
making will be most effective as a discrimination-reducing measure if it is 
accompanied by other integrative efforts, including self-examination arising 
out of attention to systemic and local demographics, structural measures aimed 
at opening collaborative work opportunities, and institutional measures 
facilitating democratic, peer-support norms.191  Requiring the employer to 
establish a micro–macro link under Title VII by placing individual race- or 
sex-based decisions within a broader integrative effort therefore serves both to 
constrain race- and sex-conscious decision making (the race- or sex-based 
decision must be plausibly intended to reduce workplace discrimination) and to 
ensure that the decision aimed at reducing discrimination is actually likely to 
do so. 
a. An Integrative Effort 
Although the specific contours of particular integrative efforts are likely to 
vary depending on the structure and goals of the firm, research suggests that a 
comprehensive integrative effort that satisfies the micro–macro link will have 
three principal defining features: processes for self-assessment and regular 
monitoring of systemic and local demographics and power imbalances; 
organizational measures aimed at facilitating intergroup interaction; and 
ongoing efforts to develop overarching norms that foster meaningful 
integration.  These features derive from the social science and organizational 
research on conditions that moderate intergroup interaction to be stereotype 
and/or bias negating rather than stereotype and/or bias confirming. 
i. Self-Examination and Monitoring 
Any comprehensive integrative effort should reflect a contextualized 
awareness of the moderating effect of demographic balance and power 
 
 190 Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 637 (1987); United Steel Workers of Am. v. Weber, 443 
U.S. 193, 208–09 (1979). 
 191 See infra notes 192–206. 
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distribution on biases in interaction and decision making.  Employers looking 
to take race or sex into account in organizing work should be required to 
undertake a diagnostic self-examination of the racial or gender equality 
dynamics within their organizations and business units.  They should be 
required to engage in systematic quantitative and qualitative data gathering and 
analysis of equality and integration conditions within their workforces.192  The 
self-assessment can serve as a roadmap for integrative efforts going forward,193 
but it should also provide for regular monitoring of systemic and local 
demographics and power imbalances.194  The integration plan should also 
designate staff and funding for carrying out the integrative effort.195  And, 
importantly, it should include processes to ensure that individuals who are 
asked to take on extra work as part of the integrative effort will be 
appropriately compensated.196 
 
 192 This self-examination might be similar to that required of federal contractors and subcontractors under 
Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (Sept. 24, 1965), except that it would have an emphasis on 
integration and equality within a workplace as well as on identifying and redressing substantial disparities 
between the representation of minorities and women in the employer’s workforce and the relevant, qualified 
labor pool.  See generally RESKIN, supra note 65, at 10 (discussing affirmative action-related obligations 
imposed on contractors and subcontractors under Executive Order 11,246). 
This type of self-examination is also common in the environmental context.  Professor Coglianese 
provides the following description of an environmental management system (EMS): 
To create an EMS, managers begin by establishing environmental goals and creating a specific 
plan to achieve those goals.  Managers and workers are assigned responsibilities for 
implementing parts of the plan, and they are trained in what they need to carry out these 
responsibilities.  They keep records that document their compliance with the plan[,] and 
periodically the firm (or an outside auditor) reviews these records and assesses the firm’s 
performance in meeting its goals and following its internal procedures.  These periodic reviews 
are supposed to feed into revisions and continuous improvements in the firm’s overall system.  
When auditing turns up deficiencies or problems, managers take remedial action and, as needed, 
amend their plan, returning to the start of what is commonly referred to as the “plan-do-check-
act” cycle. 
Cary Coglianese, The Managerial Turn in Environmental Policy, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 54, 56 (2008). 
 193 The self-assessment is not intended as a limit on efforts to integrate.  See infra Part II.B.2.b (discussing 
the role of numbers). 
 194 William T. Bielby, Minimizing Gender and Racial Bias, 29 CONTEMP. SOC. 120, 126 (2000) (citing the 
importance of regular monitoring and analysis of segregation patterns in reducing workplace bias). 
 195 See Kalev et al., supra note 27, at 611 (finding that structures establishing responsibility lead to 
increases in managerial diversity). 
 196 See Robinson, supra note 8, at 1179. 
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ii. Other Integration-Producing and Discrimination-Reducing 
Measures 
An integrative effort should also include measures other than race- or sex-
conscious decision making that are similarly intended to foster meaningful 
integration and reduce discrimination.  Some of these measures will focus on 
how work gets accomplished.  An employer might create more team-based 
work or alter its existing team-based work system to provide for more cross-
boundary, collaborative work opportunities.197  Depending on the degree of 
functional segregation in its workforce, it might target specific job categories 
for inclusion in team-based work to foster collaborative relations across 
functional divisions.198  Collaborative mentoring programs can also facilitate 
relationships at various levels of a hierarchy, and skills-building programs can 
be reworked to foster job rotation and to provide workers with training and 
experience in different jobs.199 
Other measures will focus on how work is evaluated.  An employer might 
restructure a decision-making system or information-distribution system to 
reduce the likelihood that discriminatory biases will influence decisions,200 
and/or rework formal reward structures to reward dyadic rather than individual 
performance.201  Research shows that structural measures like these are likely 
to work in conjunction with race- and sex-consciousness in organizing work to 
facilitate meaningful integration.202 
 
 197 Kalev, supra note 9, at 1603 (showing that self-directed work teams, which pull team members from 
different jobs for on-going projects and have authority over their own management processes, are more 
effective in increasing job success in management for women and minorities than problem-solving teams, 
which tend to be composed of experts, usually white men, who come together periodically to address specific 
issues). 
 198 The latter measure has the added potential advantage of altering the status of job categories 
themselves. 
 199 Kalev, supra note 9, at 1627 (showing that job-rotation skills programs are more effective in 
increasing job success in management than more traditional skills training programs). 
 200 Barbara F. Reskin & Debra Branch McBrier, Why Not Ascription? Organizations’ Employment of 
Male and Female Managers, 65 AM. SOC. REV. 210, 214 (2000) (identifying formalization of personnel 
procedures and increasing accountability as practices that can reduce biases in personnel decisions). 
 201 Shelley Brickson, The Impact of Identity Orientation on Individual and Organizational Outcomes in 
Demographically Diverse Settings, 25 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 82, 82 (2000).  Laurel Smith-Doerr also identified 
reward structures as a key difference between university and pharmaceutical companies and biotechnology 
firms in her study of the careers of women scientists.  See generally SMITH-DOERR, supra note 9. 
 202 See supra note 201. 
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iii. Overarching Norms and Work Cultures 
Research also points to the moderating effect of overarching norms and 
work cultures on discrimination and segregation.  In another article, I examine 
work culture as a source of discrimination against historically subordinated 
groups,203 but work culture can also facilitate the kind of integration that 
reduces discrimination.  Indeed, studies suggest that demographic diversity is 
more likely to reduce discrimination in workplaces where peer-like 
collaboration and supportive relations are encouraged.204  Structural measures 
aimed at facilitating integrative norms should therefore be a component of any 
integrative effort. 
Although some of these measures will overlap with structural measures 
taken to produce functional integration of work, structural changes may be 
supplemented by softer ways of fostering democratic and supportive relations, 
whether locally in teams, across business units, or throughout the workplace as 
a whole.205  Research suggests, for example, that certain types of feedback and 
consultation processes in team leadership can enhance the quality of 
interpersonal relations between members of different demographic groups.206  
This research is part of a growing body of quantitative and qualitative work on 
the conditions that maximize the “upside” of diversity for businesses.207 
Efforts instituted by employers at the policy level to foster functional 
integration should operate together with the normative message sent by this 
development in Title VII law to reshape the narrative regarding the relevance 
of race and sex in decisions organizing work.  Race and sex become relevant 
under this reshaped narrative as means of fostering integration in work, 
 
 203 See generally Green, supra note 69 (describing the role that work culture plays in discrimination and 
identifying ways to trigger structural changes to reshape work cultures). 
 204 See, e.g., Samuel B. Bacharach et al., Diversity and Homophily at Work: Supportive Relations Among 
White and African-American Peers, 48 ACAD. MGMT. J. 619, 621 (2005); Brickson, supra note 201, at 94; 
Anne S. Tsui et al., Being Different: Relational Demography and Organizational Attachment, 37 ADMIN. SCI. 
Q. 549, 559 (1992); see also ESTLUND, supra note 160, at 50–54 (describing the idea of “social capitalism” and 
the role of layout and architecture in advancing egalitarian norms). 
 205 See Bacharach et al., supra note 204, at 639.  See generally Joyce Rothschild, Creating a Just and 
Democratic Workplace: More Engagement, Less Hierarchy, 29 CONTEMP. SOC. 195 (2000) (urging 
democratic practices as a way of capturing the potential of the move toward team-based work). 
 206 See Ruth Wageman, How Leaders Foster Self-Managing Team Effectiveness: Design Choices Versus 
Hands-On Coaching, 12 ORG. SCI. 559 (2001). 
 207 See, e.g., Brickson, supra note 201, at 96 (discussing the importance of identifying conditions under 
which organizations would be better positioned to “maximize the upside and minimize the downside of 
diversity”).  More generally, some of the business literature on ways of developing corporate culture may also 
be useful, though it should be viewed critically.  See Green, supra note 69. 
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integration that will reduce stereotyping and biases in interaction, even as 
consideration of race and sex may simultaneously serve the “diversity” 
business interests that are dominant in the prevailing narrative.208  Individual 
decision makers assigning work, assembling work teams, recruiting employees 
for publicity work, etc., will be conscious of race and sex under this reshaped 
narrative, but they will not view membership in racial or gender groups as 
evidence of particular viewpoints or work capacities. 
b. The Role of Numbers 
Given the emphasis on numbers in Weber and Johnson, courts and scholars 
alike tend to assume that any consideration of race or sex in workplace 
decision making will require a particular numerical disparity to establish the 
micro–macro link.  The majority in Taxman provides the most obvious 
example, restricting consideration of race and sex to decisions intended to 
remedy a “manifest imbalance.”  But progressive legal scholars who see the 
possibility of non-remedial justifications for race- or sex-based decision 
making also seem unwilling to imagine an analysis that does not require 
employers to show a particular numerical disparity in order to take race or sex 
into account.  Professor Estlund, for example, argues that Grutter opens Title 
VII to non-remedial justifications for race- or sex-conscious decision making, 
but she adopts the “manifest imbalance” requirement of Johnson.209  Professor 
Yelnosky also carries over a numbers-based requirement into his proposed 
analysis of the non-remedial, prevention justification for race- and sex-based 
preferences in hiring, although he relaxes the requirement somewhat.210  After 
arguing persuasively that Johnson’s manifest imbalance requirement “may not 
apply to prevention plans,” Yelnosky proposes a requirement that “the 
employer . . . show an imbalance in the gender [or racial] make-up of the 
workforce.”211  Neither Estlund nor Yelnosky explain why they think that 
employers should be required to make a showing similar to that in Johnson 
when the goal being served is reducing future discrimination (or, in Estlund’s 
 
 208 For more discussion of the narrative that this development of Title VII law has the potential to create, 
see Part III.B. 
 209 Estlund, supra note 10, at 35–36 (noting that “Grutter’s recognition of the civic and societal value of 
integrated institutions provides ample reason for choosing the more accommodating reading” of Johnson, 
specifically that “[e]mployers need not cite any particular reasons for addressing a ‘manifest imbalance’ in a 
predominately white workplace or job; it is enough that the ‘manifest imbalance’ exists”). 
 210 Yelnosky, supra note 12. 
 211 Id. at 1417–19. 
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view, advancing social democracy) rather than eliminating the effects of past 
discrimination. 
While numbers—or, more accurately, the racial or gender demographics of 
a workforce, division, or work group—are as Estlund puts it “inescapably 
relevant” to any functional integrative effort,212 employers should not be 
required to point to any particular numerical imbalance to establish the Title 
VII micro–macro link.  On the contrary, an employer’s showing that its 
individual race- or sex-conscious decisions are part of a broader integrative 
effort serves the same purpose for the non-remedial justification of reducing 
discrimination as an employer’s showing of a manifest imbalance serves for 
the remedial justification.  This showing ensures that the individual decision is 
linked to the broader Title VII goal in a way that makes it likely that the race- 
or sex-based decision is furthering that goal.  Because the goal in this context 
is different—reducing future discrimination rather than removing the effects of 
past discrimination—so too should be the showing required for the micro–
macro link. 
Several practical reasons also exist for rejecting the requirement of a 
numbers-based showing for race- or sex-conscious decisions in organizing 
work.  First, reducing discrimination through integration requires attention to 
demographics at multiple levels within an organization.  An employer should 
be simultaneously seeking to integrate work groups, break down stratification 
across work divisions, and integrate the workforce as a whole.  It does not 
make sense, therefore, to restrict an employer’s effort to a single, 
demographically unbalanced business unit or job category. 
Second, considering race or sex in organizing work can further the goal of 
reducing discrimination in a variety of ways.  Requiring that each individual 
decision be part of a broader integrative effort cabins employer discretion in 
making race or sex-conscious decisions at the same time that it allows 
employer flexibility.  Employers may want to consider race or sex in 
developing publicity materials, for example, to portray the firm as diverse.  
Research shows that honoring members of different groups and portraying 
them positively helps foster cultures valuing diversity,213 but a single decision 
 
 212 Estlund, supra note 10, at 37.  Indeed, the call for an integrative effort recognizes that race and sex 
trigger stereotypes and biases and that demographics and power are key moderators of bias and prejudice. 
 213 See, e.g., HARRISON M. TRICE & JANICE M. BEYER, THE CULTURES OF WORK ORGANIZATIONS (1993); 
Jennifer A. Chatman et al., Being Different yet Feeling Similar: The Influence of Demographic Composition 
and Organizational Culture on Work Processes and Outcomes, 43 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 749, 777 (1998). 
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to feature a black woman in a television interview, particularly if the interview 
or the fact of the interview is not disseminated within the workplace, is 
unlikely to accomplish the goal of reducing discrimination.  Information about 
the interview needs to be disseminated to the workforce, and the decision to 
feature the black woman needs to be part of a larger effort to integrate and to 
create norms that value diversity and integration. 
It is possible that Professors Yelnosky and Estlund propose a requirement 
of demographic underrepresentation (whether as compared with another job 
within the employer’s workforce or as compared with a relevant labor pool) 
because the underrepresentation serves as a short-hand, a signal that 
discrimination is likely operating in a particular workplace.214  If we take the 
social science research outlined in Part I seriously, though, we should need no 
such organization-specific demonstration, even a short-hand one.  Unless the 
organization is so demographically diverse across all sectors of its workforce 
that work teams and decision-making committees formed entirely without 
regard to race or sex would be sufficiently diverse as to create stereotype- and 
bias-negating rather than stereotype- and bias-facilitating interactions, then 
race- and sex-conscious decisions organizing work—when made as part of a 
broader integrative effort—will serve the goal of reducing discrimination in the 
workplace.  Such a level of diversity will be very rare, particularly given the 
current demographic makeup of the American workforce.  Moreover, race- and 
sex-based decisions organizing work may still serve the goal of reducing future 
discrimination even in such a demographically balanced workplace.215 
Numbers, of course, will not be irrelevant to the question of whether the 
employer has established the necessary micro–macro link.  If Latino 
employees are concentrated in a particular division within a firm, for example, 
then it would be difficult for the employer to show that the decision to assign a 
 
 214 Yelnosky, supra note 12, at 1418 (“The focus would then shift to the presence of small numbers of 
women in the job in question, which would put them at special risk of discrimination.”).  Professor Estlund, in 
contrast, seems to require a showing of a “‘manifest imbalance’ in a predominately white workplace or job” as 
a way of making it more likely that race- or sex-based decisions will be “pro-integration.”  Estlund, supra note 
10, at 35–36.  At the level of organizing work, however, numbers cannot establish the necessary link between 
using race and sex in individual decisions and advancing integration.  See supra Part I.A. 
 215 Substantial change in the prevalence of underlying discriminatory biases and stereotypes would be 
required to warrant a shift in the legality of race- and sex-based decisions organizing work as a discrimination-
reducing measure.  Professors Kang and Banaji make a similar point.  See Kang & Banaji, supra note 12, at 
1116 (“Fair measures that are race- or gender-conscious will become presumptively unnecessary when the 
nation’s implicit bias against those social categories goes to zero or its negligible behavioral equivalent.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
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Latino worker to that division was part of an integrative effort.  Indeed, this is 
one way in which applying this interpretation of Title VII to decisions 
organizing work will refocus attention to the systemic instead of the individual 
level.216 
Nor should numbers be irrelevant.  One of the benefits of an integration 
approach to race and sex in organizing work under Title VII is its emphasis on 
the role of numbers in understanding discrimination and inequality in the 
workplace.  An integration approach brings self-examination of parity and 
demographics back to the forefront of antidiscrimination law.  To be permitted 
to use race and sex in decisions organizing work, employers must not only 
monitor demographics; they must identify the obstacles to equality and take 
efforts to change the structures and social practices that entrench segregation 
and discrimination in their workplaces. 
III.  POSSIBILITIES AND CONCERNS 
Applying an integration approach to race and sex in organizing work under 
Title VII presents an untapped opportunity to advance workplace equality.  
Because decisions organizing work are “softer” than decisions about whom to 
hire, fire, or promote, both in the multi-factored, discretionary nature of their 
decision-making processes and in the discernability and immediacy of their 
benefits and harms, considering race and sex in organizing work—as guided 
by Title VII—may prove a more effective tool for reducing discrimination and 
advancing equality than considering race and sex in decisions regarding 
precise points of entry, exit, or advancement.217  Not only is permitting 
consideration of race and sex in organizing work likely to attain greater 
normative traction than traditional affirmative action efforts, but by harnessing 
 
 216 See supra note 13 (describing the move toward regulatory focus on structures and systems over the ex 
post facto identification of specific instances of discrimination). 
 217 Because the immediate harms and benefits of decisions organizing work are often softer than the 
harms and benefits of decisions at hiring, promotion, or discharge, considering race and sex in organizing work 
is also unlikely to trammel the interests of members of any particular group.  Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 
U.S. 616, 630 (1987) (holding that the use of race or sex under Title VII is not permitted to “trammel the 
interests” of others (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979)).  In Weber, the 
Court explained that the plan there did not “unnecessarily trammel the interests of the white employees” 
because it did not require “the discharge of white workers and their replacement with new black hirees” or 
create “an absolute bar to the advancement of white employees.”  Weber, 443 U.S. at 208.  Considering race or 
sex in organizing work as one factor in determining which employees to place on a particular work team—
even if, for example, the decision is shown to cause harm by affecting opportunities for job tasks and 
relationships—is unlikely to tread upon entitlements, result in quotas, or provide the immediate impetus for 
discharge. 
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business interests at the policy level within organizations, Title VII is capable 
of generating a new narrative that couples structural reform to day-to-day 
social practices.  Developing a comprehensive analysis of Title VII as it 
applies to decisions organizing work can help push organizations to 
incorporate integration in work into their diversity programs. 
A. Practical Concerns 
I anticipate several concerns about the practical effects of the proposed 
interpretation of Title VII.  This interpretation pushes Title VII in a new 
regulatory direction.  Instead of mandating or prohibiting specific structures for 
all employers or requiring that certain outcomes such as specific demographic 
balances or disparities be achieved or avoided, this proposal propels Title VII 
into the realm of management-based regulation.  It focuses regulatory attention 
on employers’ self-examination processes and on their efforts to instill a 
variety of integration-advancing organizational and management structures.218  
Moreover, because tying individual race- and sex-based decisions organizing 
work to a broader integrative effort would serve as a justification for race- and 
sex-based decision making, the proposed development of Title VII is likely to 
have an impact on the ability of plaintiffs to obtain judgments of liability in 
this area. 
The most immediate concern raised by my interpretation of Title VII stems 
from the need for judicial monitoring of organizational decisions.  The idea 
here is that courts cannot (or will not) adequately monitor employers’ 
integrative efforts.  Instead, courts will defer to employers, irrespective of the 
effectiveness of the measures being implemented, and employers will fill the 
regulatory gaps with measures that have little to no effect on workplace 
equality.219  Professor Lauren Edelman’s research on the endogeneity of law 
 
 218 In the employment discrimination context, this approach to regulation has been most commonly called 
a “problem-solving approach.”  See Sturm, supra note 99, at 484.  I use the term “management-based” here in 
an effort to better capture the role of regulatory oversight in this approach.  Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, 
Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 691 (2003) (examining use of management-based regulatory strategy in areas of food safety, industrial 
safety, and environmental protection).  According to Professors Coglianese and Lazer, a management-based 
regulatory instrument is defined by its focus on regulating firms’ planning processes and efforts at achieving 
specific public goals.  Id. at 692. 
 219 See, e.g., Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81 
WASH. U. L.Q. 487, 523 (2003).  For discussion of this and other challenges faced by efforts to address 
discrimination in employment through a reframing of the nondiscrimination obligation, see Tristin K. Green, 
Targeting Workplace Context: Title VII as a Tool for Institutional Reform, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 659 (2003).  
This concern is common to all management-based regulatory systems.  For a discussion of the monitoring 
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provides support for this concern.220  Her research shows that judges over time 
have tended to view institutionalized organizational structures—those that 
have become commonly adopted across organizations—as indicators of 
nondiscrimination even if those structures do little to reduce discrimination.221  
Moreover, it appears that judges are more likely to defer to these 
institutionalized structures when they are asked to review organizational 
attributes that are not directly observable.222 
One way of reducing the difficulties associated with judicial review of 
integrative efforts might be to carve a greater role for agencies and/or private 
entities in overseeing and devising integrative efforts.223  Much as the Office of 
Federal Contract Compliance Program (OFCCP) monitors federal contractors’ 
affirmative action efforts through compliance reviews,224 a government agency 
such as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission could monitor 
integrative efforts.  Firms seeking to undertake race- and sex-conscious 
decisions organizing work might engage with social scientists and other 
experts employed by the EEOC to develop and provide evidence of integrative 
efforts.  Private, third-party auditors might also serve as monitors.225 
The concern about judicial willingness may also hold somewhat less 
weight in this context because of the courts’ long history of examining 
affirmative action plans to determine whether they were adopted for a 
 
problem across substantive areas of law that draws parallels to delegation of decision making to administrative 
agencies, see Kenneth A. Bamberger, Regulation as Delegation: Private Firms, Decision Making, and 
Accountability in the Administrative State, 56 DUKE L.J. 377 (2006).  In the employment discrimination 
context, Professor Susan Sturm provides the most sophisticated account of possible solutions to monitoring 
difficulties generated by “problem-solving” approaches to regulation.  See, e.g., Joanne Scott & Susan Sturm, 
Courts as Catalysts: Re-thinking the Judicial Role in New Governance, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 565 (2007) 
(exploring a new role for courts in management-based regulation); Susan Sturm, The Architecture of Inclusion: 
Advancing Workplace Equity in Higher Education, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 247 (2006) (using a case study as 
a springboard for exploring the role of institutional intermediaries in monitoring change). 
 220 Lauren B. Edelman et al., The Endogeneity of Legal Regulation: Grievance Procedures as Rational 
Myth, 105 AM. J. SOC. 406 (1999); see also Susan Bisom-Rapp, Bulletproofing the Workplace: Symbol and 
Substance in Employment Discrimination Law Practice, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 959 (1999); Lauren B. 
Edelman, Legal Environments and Organizational Governance: The Expansion of Due Process in the 
American Workplace, 95 AM. J. SOC. 1401 (1990) (discussing the role of personnel professionals in diffusing 
organizational compliance mechanisms).  
 221 Edelman et al., Endogeneity of Legal Regulation, supra note 220. 
 222 See id. 
 223 Coglianese, supra note 192. 
 224 RESKIN, supra note 65, at 11. 
 225 The Environmental Protection Agency has experimented with the use of private auditors in the 
environmental context.  See Howard C. Kunreuther et al., Third-Party Inspection as an Alternative to 
Command and Control Regulation, 22 RISK ANALYSIS 309, 316–317 (2002). 
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permissible purpose and whether they are likely to further that purpose.  
Indeed, one of the benefits of undertaking a management-based strategy as part 
of a justification of the voluntary use of race and sex in organizing work lies in 
its posture as a voluntary effort.226  Because the law provides a justification for 
using race and sex, rather than interpreting the law’s initial prohibition on 
discrimination (as all other proposals advocating a move toward organizational 
reform to date have done), it provides space for experimentation.  If empirical 
work shows that courts (or other monitors) are doing an inadequate job of 
monitoring, then Congress can amend Title VII to provide for a different 
means of monitoring or even so that it no longer permits any consideration of 
race or sex in organizing work. 
Apart from the monitoring difficulty, there is also a risk that applying an 
integration approach under Title VII to race and sex in organizing work will be 
counter-productive, providing employers with a ready-made escape hatch to 
existing, sometimes successful, efforts to hold employers liable for 
discriminatory biases in organizing work.  Take, for example, the class action 
lawsuit against American Express.227  The plaintiffs alleged that women 
suffered pay discrimination because discriminatory bias played a role in 
assignments to lucrative clients.228  American Express used an informal system 
of choosing “superstars” from incoming recruits and assigned its best, most 
lucrative accounts to those employees.229  The assignment of clients is likely a 
decision organizing work; the assignments did not directly determine the 
employee’s pay and, therefore, would not themselves be considered adverse 
employment actions.  Does applying an integration approach to these decisions 
offer employers a way out of liability?  Could American Express have 
successfully argued, in other words, that it considered sex in assigning work as 
part of a broader integrative effort aimed at reducing discrimination?  I think 
not, and this brings us back to the role of numbers in establishing the requisite 
micro–macro link.  If women as a group are generally assigned the less 
prestigious and less lucrative clients, then employers should find it difficult to 
persuade a fact finder that these assignments were part of an integrative effort 
 
 226 There is reason to believe that a management-based strategy will be more effective when it is 
associated with voluntary rather than mandated action on fronts that are currently not being regulated.  See 
generally Coglianese, supra note 192, at 69 (noting that in the environmental context, management strategies 
may be more effective in unregulated areas).  This is one of the added benefits of the interpretation of Title VII 
proposed in this Article:  Employers will have an incentive to undertake integrative measures voluntarily. 
 227 Complaint, Kosen v. Am. Express Fin. Advisors, Inc., No. 1:02-CV0082 (D.D.C. June 17, 2002). 
 228 Id. at 10. 
 229 Id. at 11. 
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aimed at reducing discrimination.  That said, it is possible that a fact finder 
would find for the defendant (or would defer to the employer’s assertion that it 
was seeking to reduce discrimination).  The risk seems no higher, however, 
than the risk that a fact finder would accept the employer’s argument that 
discrimination should not be inferred from stratification/segregation statistics 
because the employer was otherwise concerned about the job success of 
women in its workplace.230 
The impact on individual lawsuits is likely to be more substantial.  Unless 
an individual has evidence of discriminatory animus or bias on the part of a 
decision maker or evidence of a pattern of assignment that is inconsistent with 
an integrative effort, she may lose her claim to the employer’s argument that it 
did take her race into account in assigning work but that it did so as part of its 
broader integrative effort.  Potential plaintiffs with comparative evidence, for 
example, may find another hurdle to success in a claim of individual disparate 
treatment.  Similarly, the woman who is asked to do extra work because of her 
sex and is not compensated for that work may lose her claim of individual 
disparate treatment when the employer shows that it asked her to do that work 
as part of a broader integrative effort that includes processes to ensure 
compensation for that work.231  These are real costs of the interpretation of 
Title VII that I advance, but the costs should be outweighed by the benefits 
obtained by refocusing Title VII on structures and systems and by reshaping 
the narrative regarding the relevance of race and sex in organizing work to 
serve the goals of integration and reduced discrimination at work.232 
Finally, one might question whether this approach asks too much of 
businesses that are sincerely committed to equality and nondiscrimination.  It 
is not unheard of, for example, for a law school’s deans to put more pressure 
on its women faculty and faculty of color than on its white, male faculty to 
attend weekend admission events and student recruitment dinners.  Deans may 
do this with the laudable aim of attracting a more diverse student body.  Under 
my proposal, even if the law school is otherwise committed to having a diverse 
faculty and takes measures to attain and retain a diverse faculty, it will still 
 
 230 See, e.g., EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302, 319–322 (7th Cir. 1988) (upholding the 
district court’s finding that an underrepresentation of women in commission jobs was due to women’s lack of 
interest and not due to discrimination within the organization). 
 231 See supra note 196 and accompanying text (requiring procedures to compensate women and minorities 
for additional work). 
 232 Indeed, only if the justification actually protects employers against liability in some cases will 
employers be motivated to undertake the integrative effort. 
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have to show that it has undertaken a broad integrative effort and that the 
decision to showcase women and faculty of color to students is part of that 
effort.  This requirement could impose substantial costs associated with 
undertaking an integrative effort on the organization, and may even result in 
the hiring of one fewer faculty member (maybe even one fewer woman and/or 
person of color) for lack of funds.  Is the benefit worth the cost?  In some 
individual cases, the answer may be “no,” but in the general run of cases—at 
the level of policy making—I think the answer will be “yes.”  Requiring an 
integrative effort forces even well-meaning institutions to take stock of 
demographics and power differentials, at least if they want to take race or sex 
into account in organizing work. 
Some institutions will decide that the cost is too high, in which case they 
may make more of an effort to protect against discriminatory biases in 
organizing work.  Indeed, even if most employers decide based on this 
interpretation of Title VII that they will not allow consideration of race or sex 
in organizing work, the effect of the law is still likely to be positive.  If race 
and sex are currently being used as a signal—internally and externally—that 
all is equal and nondiscriminatory within work organizations, then 
transparency itself may be useful.  Either way, whether by harnessing business 
interests or forcing transparency, the law will have triggered an important, 
forward-looking inquiry into the use of race and sex in decision making and 
discrimination at the level of organizing work. 
B. The Effect of a New Narrative 
It is also important to think carefully about the effect of the reframed 
narrative regarding the relevance of race and sex to decisions organizing work 
on broader social equality goals.  This narrative has the potential to 
dramatically alter the context of intergroup interactions at work and, 
accordingly, to redirect the construction of race and sex in work, but it also 
carries with it some risks. 
Any use of race or sex in employment decision making carries with it a risk 
that the perceived beneficiary of the decision will be cast as undeserving.  
Studies show that when the perceived beneficiary casts herself as undeserving, 
she can suffer from an internal sense of stigma and self-doubt that can translate 
to lower motivation and commitment and less ambitious task selection.233  
 
 233 Krieger, supra note 140, at 1264–70. 
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When others cast her as undeserving, moreover, they are likely to assume that 
she is less capable and are more likely to engage in stereotyping.234  The 
research also shows, however, that the self-derogation effects of the use of race 
or sex in decision making tend to disappear when subjects are told that 
qualifications as well as group membership were used in making selections.235  
Race and sex in organizing work, guided by Title VII, should be part of an 
employer’s broad pronouncement that race and sex may be considered as one 
factor in otherwise complex and multi-factored, discretionary decisions about 
the organization of work and work tasks.  To the extent that qualifications 
rather than group membership take center stage in making these decisions, the 
risks of taking race and sex into account should be reduced substantially. 
Relatedly, consideration of race and sex in organizing work is less likely to 
generate perceptions of unfairness than consideration of those characteristics at 
points of entry, exit, or promotion.236  Again, because decisions organizing 
work are typically multi-factored and discretionary, the use of race or sex as a 
factor in these decisions is less likely to be viewed as antithetical to the merit-
based norm. 
There remains some risk, nonetheless, that considering race and sex in 
organizing work will reinforce stereotypic assumptions about outgroup 
inferiority by providing a plausible situational attribution for the job successes 
of women and minorities.  Employees will not know when race played a role; 
they may assume that it always plays a role.  Indeed, research suggests that 
they are likely to assume that it played a role more often when women or 
minorities are placed in positions of power or prestige than when white men 
are placed in those positions.237  Some risk of stereotype-reinforcing 
assumptions is attendant to all uses of race and sex in decision making, and 
using race and sex in organizing work is no exception. 
Based in part on this reality, I expect some commentators will object to the 
Title VII analysis presented here on the ground that it permits classification on 
the basis of protected factors at all.  Any race- or sex-based classification, this 
 
 234 Id. 
 235 Id.; see also Brenda Major et al., Attributional Ambiguity of Affirmative Action, 15 BASIC & APPLIED 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 113, 119 (1994) (“[I]f a beneficiary is confident that he or she deserves a position . . . selection 
policies emphasizing group membership will not be detrimental to his or her self-evaluations.”). 
 236 See Rothschild, supra note 205 (discussing organizational practices in the workplace); see also 
Krieger, supra note 140, at 1271–72 (describing the role of perceived fairness in resistance to affirmative 
action programs). 
 237 Krieger, supra note 140, at 1264–70 (describing research in this area). 
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argument goes, perpetuates stereotyping and exacerbates intergroup tensions.  
These commentators would argue that instead of permitting consideration of 
race or sex under any circumstances, we should strive to ignore race and sex in 
all employment decisions. 
While it is true that making intergroup differences salient can exacerbate 
stereotyping and bias (and for that reason an integrative effort should include 
efforts to foster a climate of peer-like collaboration and supportive relations), 
an integration approach to considering race and sex in organizing work serves 
to protect against stereotyping by deemphasizing diversity as group-based 
difference.  Managers who organize work are not permitted under this 
approach to take race or sex into account based on their assumptions about 
how members of particular racial or gender groups will behave or what they 
will contribute as members of those groups.  Rather, the narrative as reframed 
by the proposed interpretation of Title VII emphasizes the benefits of 
integration to the business and to all workers. 
One of the greatest strengths of the proposed interpretation of Title VII law 
may be its potential to reframe the narrative regarding the relevance of race 
and sex in organizing work and, ultimately, our perceptions about the 
relevance of race and sex to work.238  As this Article demonstrates, race and 
sex already influence decisions organizing work.  Most workers now are likely 
to assume that race and sex are relevant only for decisions involving women 
and people of color (and that they are relevant only as serving or signaling 
devices).  Title VII has the potential to reframe the diversity narrative so that 
race and sex are relevant (and perceived as relevant) for all workers.  If 
workers begin to assume that race and sex often play some role, even a very 
minor one, in decisions organizing work, maybe that will dampen the sense 
that race matters in some decisions but not others.  This could be the beginning 
of a new diversity narrative under which race and sex are relevant as means of 
creating opportunities for positive intergroup contact that will benefit workers 
as well as the firms for which they work.239 
 
 238 See generally Ellen C. Berrey, How Diversity Excludes: Organizational Diversity Rhetoric and 
Programs in Three U.S. Field Sites (May 2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (highlighting the 
importance of probing organizational meaning-making for racial equality). 
 239 See Thomas & Ely, supra note 26, at 260 (presenting research suggesting that an “integration-and-
learning” diversity perspective leads to better work group functioning than other perspectives). 
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CONCLUSION 
This Article exposes the risks and possibilities of the conscious use of race 
and sex in organizing work and presents a new way for Title VII to trigger 
structural changes as well as individual race- and sex-based decisions that are 
likely to increase functional integration and reduce workplace discrimination.  
Without such a comprehensive approach, the use of race and sex in organizing 
work is likely to result in increased discrimination and entrenched inequality.  
The interpretation of Title VII presented here offers an opportunity for 
businesses to attain the bottom-line benefits associated with cross-cultural 
competence and reduced discrimination at the same time that those businesses 
advance the nation’s social justice interests. 
This Article also exposes important lines of future empirical research that 
could inform deliberations about whether and how the law is working to serve 
its goals.  This research may show, for example, that courts or other 
monitoring actors are not adequately monitoring organizational efforts, or that 
the costs placed on individual women and minorities by race- and sex-based 
decisions organizing work are contributing to broader group-based 
subordination and inequality in work.  Either of these findings might affect the 
balance between private and public monitors, the precise contours of 
regulatory requirements, or even the undertaking itself.  Because the law 
developed here identifies a justification for race- and sex-based decision 
making, policy makers should be particularly receptive to evidence that the 
justification is either directly ineffective or that its indirect effects are taking 
antidiscrimination law or norms astray. 
More broadly, this Article attends to relations in employment 
discrimination law.  It focuses attention on the role that social interactions play 
in producing and reproducing disadvantage at work and on the role of 
organizational and institutional structures both in enabling and shaping biased 
interactions and in generating meaningful interventions for reform.  In doing 
so, it pushes us to think more concretely about contextual influences not just 
on individual mindsets but also on the social interactions through which the 
contemporary dynamics of race and sex are carried out. 
 
